



# 2022 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS

MID-YEAR UPDATE

# Acknowledgements

The *GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update* is the output of a unique partnership and technical process that brings together the expertise of 17 food security and nutrition partner organisations to update the information presented in the GRFC 2022 and is facilitated by the Food Security Information Network.

We wish to thank the teams on the ground who collect the information, conduct the analyses and produce the reports on which this document is based. We also wish to thank the Technical Working Groups, Senior Committee and senior staff at all partner institutions whose contributions ensure a richer analysis of acute

food insecurity and malnutrition and the challenges that we face as a global community. In particular we thank all contributors for working against a tight deadline to ensure that this important information on acutely food-insecure and malnourished populations be made available for the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We would like to thank the European Union (EU) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) whose need to better understand the severity and magnitude of food crises at the global level continues to support this unique product.



# Contents

<b>CHAPTER 1 A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES</b> .....	<b>5</b>
The highest number of acutely food-insecure people in GRFC history.....	6
Acute food insecurity in mid-2022.....	8
Spotlights on two key topics of concern in mid-2022.....	14
<i>Global and domestic food prices</i> .....	14
<i>Drought in the Horn of Africa</i> .....	16
<b>CHAPTER 2 REGIONAL OVERVIEWS OF FOOD CRISES</b> .....	<b>19</b>
Central and Southern Africa.....	20
East Africa.....	22
West Africa and the Sahel.....	24
Eurasia.....	26
Latin America and the Caribbean.....	28
<b>APPENDIX 1 TABLE OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ESTIMATES, 2020–2022</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>TECHNICAL NOTES</b> .....	<b>35</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>50</b>

## Required citation

**FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2022.**  
*GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update. Rome.*

All rights reserved. Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product for educational or other non-commercial uses are authorized without any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Reproduction of material in this information product for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission. Applications for such permission should be addressed to the Food Security Information Network Secretariat, email: [fsin-secretariat@wfp.org](mailto:fsin-secretariat@wfp.org)

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), its constituent parties and its partners concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

©FSIN 2022

---

## Map disclaimer

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on all the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

## Acronyms

<b>ACAPS</b>	Assessment Capacities Project	<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>AMIS</b>	Agricultural Market Information System	<b>IFPRI</b>	International Food Policy Research Institute
<b>ASAL</b>	Arid and semi-arid lands	<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa)
<b>CARI</b>	Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security	<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>CH</b>	Cadre Harmonisé	<b>DGINTPA</b>	European Commission Directorate-General for International Partnerships
<b>CILSS</b>	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control (Comité permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel)	<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>COVID-19</b>	Corona virus disease 2019	<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
<b>DTM</b>	Displacement Tracking Matrix	<b>IPC AMN</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Acute Malnutrition
<b>ECLAC</b>	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	<b>IPC FRC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee
<b>EFSA</b>	Emergency Food Security Assessment	<b>MUAC</b>	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization	<b>NDMA</b>	National Disaster Management Agency (Kenya)
<b>FAO-GIEWS</b>	FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture	<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>FCT</b>	Federal Capital Territory	<b>RPCA</b>	Food Crisis Prevention Network (Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires)
<b>FEWS NET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>FSIN</b>	Food Security Information Network	<b>SAM</b>	Severe Acute Malnutrition
<b>FSNAU</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit	<b>SICA</b>	Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana
<b>FSNWG</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group	<b>SNNPR</b>	Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
<b>GAM</b>	Global Acute Malnutrition	<b>SOFI</b>	The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
<b>GEOGLAM</b>	Group on Earth Observations Global Agricultural Monitoring Initiative	<b>TWG</b>	Technical Working Group
<b>GFSC</b>	Global Food Security Cluster	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>GNAFC</b>	Global Network Against Food Crises	<b>UNCT</b>	United Nations Country Team
<b>GNC</b>	Global Nutrition Cluster	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>GRFC</b>	Global Report on Food Crises	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>HNO</b>	Humanitarian Needs Overview	<b>UNRWA</b>	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan	<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>IDB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank	<b>WB</b>	World Bank
		<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
		<b>WHZ</b>	Weight-for-height Z-score



# CHAPTER 1

---

A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES

# The highest number of acutely food-insecure people in GRFC history

By mid-2022, the population facing the three highest phases of acute food insecurity was greater than at any point in the six-year history of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC).

According to the GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update, the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent – that is the number of people requiring urgent humanitarian assistance – is forecast to reach **up to 205.1 million** in 45 of the 53 countries/territories included in the GRFC 2022, published in May 2022.<sup>1</sup>

This number includes **14 new or updated 2022 peak estimates** that were released since the publication of the annual report. For the majority of these estimates, the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent has been revised upwards since 2021.<sup>2</sup>

For these 45 countries/territories, the data included in this GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update represents **an increase of up to 29.5 million people** between 2021 and 2022 despite many populations in food crisis receiving humanitarian and development assistance, suggesting that needs continue to surpass current support and capacities.


This increase must be interpreted with care, given that it can be attributed to both a worsening acute food insecurity situation and an expansion in the population analysed (12 percent) between 2021 and 2022.

However, even when considering the share of the analysed population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent, the proportion of the population in these phases has increased in 2022 compared to 2021.

<sup>1</sup> Between 201.4 and 205.1 million people were forecast to be in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity or equivalent in the 45 countries/territories with available data in 2022. The aggregate forecast number is provided as a range as it includes FEWS NET range estimates for Nicaragua, Uganda, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.

<sup>2</sup> The 14 countries are Burundi, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iraq, Jordan (Syrian refugees), Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Ukraine.

## Famine projected in Somalia

 As this GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update went to press in September 2022, the Somalia IPC Technical Working Group (TWG) and IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) reported that in south-central Somalia, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is projected in two areas in the Bay region (Baidoa and Burhakaba districts)<sup>3</sup> and a significant scale-up of humanitarian assistance is urgently required.

**The projection of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is the result of the unprecedented failure of four consecutive rainy seasons, on top of conflict, severe economic shocks and mass population displacement. Famine (IPC Phase 5) will most likely occur between October–December 2022 and persist until at least March 2023 due to a predicted failed fifth rainy season**

<sup>3</sup> The projection of Famine specifically relates to rural areas of Baidoa and Burhakaba districts and newly arrived IDPs in Baidoa.

(IPC FRC, September 2022). Famines are rare and extreme events leading to intense human suffering with lasting consequences for those affected. The projection of these conditions in Somalia is an alarm bell that we are not doing enough. Even in the absence of a Famine, significant excess deaths can be expected to occur.

**This GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update reinforces the urgent call for large-scale, immediate and appropriate life-saving assistance to avoid mass starvation and the widespread deaths of adults and children. For more information on the ongoing humanitarian emergency in Somalia, see page 12 and reports from the IPC FRC and the IPC TWG.**

## Data gaps obscure the full picture

In order to capture the total number of people facing acute food insecurity globally, this Mid-Year Update emphasises the need to continue expanding reliable analyses in a broader set of countries. Of the 53 GRFC 2022 countries/territories with comparable and consensual estimates for 2021, this report provides estimates for 45. This is due to lack of data availability for 2022. Estimates for 2022 were not available for eight countries/territories, including the Syrian Arab Republic, Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar) and Palestine. If the 2021 figures for these eight were added to the 2022 aggregate estimate, an additional 17.3 million people would be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 2022. Additionally, due to the timing of some 2022 analyses, many peak estimates do not capture the compounding impacts of the war in Ukraine.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Of the 45 countries where 2022 analyses were available, only 16 peak estimates took into account the effects of the war in Ukraine. See overview for details.

Of the 77 countries/territories identified for inclusion in the GRFC 2022 as potential food crises, 24 were not covered due to lack of consensual and comparable data. For example, acute food insecurity estimates covering countries of concern previously identified in the GRFC 2022, including the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, are not included in the aggregate figure of 205.1 million for 2022. This underscores both the need to improve data collection and build consensus on existing analyses so as to build a truly global picture of acute food insecurity.

## Evidence points to increasing impact of shocks

The figures do suggest that the drivers of food crises severely affect food systems at global, regional, national and household levels, leading to increasing numbers of people facing acute food insecurity, particularly poor and vulnerable people. The main drivers of food crises – conflict and insecurity, global and national economic shocks and weather extremes – are continuous and

relentless, and compounded by long-term pressures on food systems. The rapid-fire succession of shocks aggravates the severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity. Households in food-crisis contexts cannot recover from one episode before another strikes.

Our spotlight on global and domestic food prices (see page 14) shows how the **cost of food has been rising steadily** since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. International food commodity prices were at a ten-year high before the economic shocks of the war in Ukraine. Although prices in international markets for staple foods, such as wheat, maize and vegetable oils have returned to pre-invasion levels, consumer food prices remain high and therefore purchasing power is not expected to improve significantly.

While many of the analyses on which this Mid-Year Update is based were carried out too early to capture **the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine on the global economy**, all GRFC partners flagged that the rising costs of energy, inputs, production and trade are likely to have a major impact on coming agricultural seasons: farmers may plant less, produce less, export less and earn less. Risks of civil unrest due to high food prices combined with macroeconomic challenges, such as high unemployment rates, and the rising cost of living have also increased (UN, June 2022).

Our spotlight on **drought in the Horn of Africa** draws attention to at least 18.8 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in drought-affected areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia in mid-2022, a result of successive poor rainy seasons affecting pastoral and agricultural livelihoods.<sup>5</sup> An estimated 6.1 million children under 5 years are projected to suffer from wasting at some point during the course of 2022 in these three countries, including 1.8 million with severe wasting (FSNWG, July 2022).

In mid-2022, the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity in countries with available data is truly alarming. The countries included in this GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update require greater humanitarian assistance in 2022 than 2021, as well as medium and long-term resilience building, livelihood protection and disaster risk reduction support. Never has there been a greater need to act together to tackle the root global causes of food crises.

<sup>5</sup> Although estimates vary, between 18.8–21.3 million people were forecast to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in drought affected areas of these three countries.

### A note on the numbers

The majority of the acute food insecurity estimates included in the GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update are current analyses or projections from IPC/CH, which identify the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent based on available data and the most likely scenarios during a projected period. In countries where an IPC/CH estimate is unavailable, an IPC-compatible estimated range of the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is provided by FEWS NET, based on a most-likely scenario in the absence of humanitarian food assistance. Other acute food insecurity data sources employed in this report include WFP estimates, based on the CARI methodology, as well as Humanitarian Need Overviews (HNOs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs).

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources for Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.

When recent IPC/CH data are not available, alternative sources are considered such as FEWS NET or the WFP CARI scale. FEWS NET and IPC use the same scale although FEWS NET figures may differ as it uses a different approach. CARI is an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. As a general rule, based on consensus between partners in the framework of the GRFC, populations that are classified as 'moderately food insecure' and 'severely food insecure' as per WFP CARI methodology are reported as broadly equivalent to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

The objective of this report is to update GRFC 2022 acute food insecurity figures. The number and analyses generated for 2022 are based on:

- Available 2022 peak estimates that were reported in the GRFC 2022, as well as 14 new or revised peak estimates released between April and August 2022. Between these two sources, 2022 data are available for 45 of the 53 GRFC 2022 food-crisis countries/territories;
- Estimates of acute food insecurity within populations and geographical areas covered by IPC/CH, FEWS NET, WFP CARI, HNOs/HRPs, which do not necessarily provide 100 percent population and geographical coverage (see Annex 1);

## The foundation of the GRFC: an evidence-based public good



**A strong and expanding partnership**



**A highly consultative process**



**A technical document of reference on food crises**



**A compilation of multiple consensus-based food security and nutrition analyses**

- Population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent – i.e. those in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.

All partners agree on the severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity for the countries/territories included in this GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update. However, for 2022 estimates covering Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Nigeria, the Niger, the Sudan and Yemen, FEWS NET produced estimates that were lower than those provided by the IPC Technical Working Groups, the CH and the 2022 Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) (see Technical Notes). FEWS NET also provided disclaimers for additional countries with 2021 data included in the GRFC 2022 (see Technical Notes). These differences contribute to FEWS NET obtaining a different trend in estimating global needs between 2021 and 2022.

# Acute food insecurity in mid-2022

## An alarming rise in populations in the highest phases of acute food insecurity



up to **205.1M people** in 45 countries/territories in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 2022

201.4M–205.1M people were forecast to be in these phases as FEWS NET supplied range estimates for Nicaragua, Uganda, Ukraine and Zimbabwe. The upper range has been used for the infographics in this GRFC Mid-Year Update.



When comparing the same 45 countries with data in 2021 and 2022, the proportion of the analysed population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent increased from 20% to 21%. The analysed population increased by 12%.

The analysed population increased from nearly 863 million people in 2021 to over 972 million in 2022 within the 45 countries/territories covered in this Update.

FIGURE 1  
**Increase in the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2021–2022**





FIGURE 2  
**Increase in the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories with 2022 data, 2021–2022**



\*Of the 53 countries/territories in the GRFC 2022, eight had no available data in 2022: Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar), Liberia, Libya, Palestine, Rwanda (refugees), Syrian Arab Republic and Syrian refugee populations in Egypt and Lebanon.

Source: FSIN, using IPC, CH, FEWS NET, WFP and HNO data.

As of mid-August 2022, the GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update estimates that as many as 205.1 million will face Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 45 countries<sup>6</sup> out of the 53 included in the GRFC 2022 in May. This estimate is based on projections made in 2021 and new data available by mid-August 2022 and constitutes the highest number reported in the seven-year history of the GRFC.

On 5 September, the Somalia IPC TWG/FRC projected that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur in two districts of Bay region in October–December 2022 and persist until March 2023 in the absence of large-scale assistance (see page 12 for details).

The 2022 aggregate figure of 205.1 million people does not include eight countries/territories, including the Syrian Arab Republic, Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar) and Palestine, for which 2022 data were not yet available. If the 2021 figures for these countries/territories were added to the 2022 aggregate estimate, an additional 17.3 million people would be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent.

Some assessments were conducted prior to the war in Ukraine and do not capture the compounding effects of the war. Of the 45 countries with 2022 analyses, 16 peak estimates took into account the effects of the war in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup> The peak estimate for Yemen included a limited analysis of the impacts, given that the war began during the IPC process. Although the latest analyses for Afghanistan, Eswatini, and Lesotho were not the 2022 peak estimates, the effects of the war in Ukraine were considered.


The increases in the acutely food-insecure population are mainly the product of a combination of **conflict, successive and sustained economic shocks, and weather extremes** that adversely impact

food security at the national, regional and global level (see the spotlight on global and domestic food prices, page 14). In 2022, the acute food insecurity crisis across the **Horn of Africa** continued to worsen as a result of an **unprecedented multi-season drought**, which began in late 2020, combined with conflict, displacement, and macroeconomic shocks (see the spotlight on drought in the Horn of Africa, page 16).

Expanded geographic or population coverage of assessments is a contributing factor to the increasing figures of people facing acute food insecurity. Between 2021 and 2022, the analysed population increased by 12 percent to over 972 million for the 45 countries/territories with data in 2022. For detailed information on coverage differences between 2021 and 2022, see Technical Notes, page 41.

Of the 45 countries/territories with data in 2021 and 2022, the **most significant increase** in the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) was in **Nigeria (21 States and the FCT)**, followed by **Somalia** and **Yemen** (see figure 2).

FIGURE 3  
**Seven countries/territories saw an increase of over 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above between 2021 and 2022**



This calculation looks exclusively at countries/territories where the 2021 and 2022 estimates were based on the same source and methodology and are therefore fully comparable. However, the country population data used by the IPC analyses for Malawi and Sudan increased (see Technical Notes).

Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH; GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.



## Percentage increases in populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, 2021–2022


MAP 1

### Of the 23 countries/territories where the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above increased since 2021, 19 experienced at least double-digit increases

Of the 45 countries/territories covered by this update, ten recorded over 50% increases in the numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above owing to escalating food prices, weather extremes and conflict/insecurity, mainly in **East Africa, West Africa and the Sahel**.

The worsening situation in **Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger** and **Nigeria** (21 states and the FCT) can be attributed to the compounding impacts of continued or heightened conflict/insecurity and related displacement, economic shocks, high food prices and weather extremes.

Large deteriorations in the **Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania** and **Senegal** are largely the result of economic shocks, which have contributed to steep food price hikes. The number of people in CH Phase 3 or above increased between 78 and 82% between 2021 and 2022.



Percentage increase in populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above in countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses, 2021–2022

- 0–10% increase
- 10–50% increase
- 50–100% increase
- ≥100% increase
- Only partial analysis available for Kenya, Madagascar, Pakistan and United Republic of Tanzania
- Countries not facing an increase; with no comparable data; or not selected for GRFC 2022 analysis

Of the 45 GRFC countries/territories with available data in 2022, 22 countries/territories either experienced a stable or decreasing trend in the populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent or did not have comparable data for 2021 and 2022. For example, no 2021–2022 comparable data were available for Ethiopia and Ukraine (see page 10 for more details).

The 15 CH countries/territories included in this analysis were conducted before the war in Ukraine disrupted global food prices and did not consider the potential impacts of global food price hikes on populations, thus the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above could be higher than estimated.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.



Source: FSIN, GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.

## Five countries/territories have more than 15 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent

© WFP/MICHAEL TEWEIDE




### Deteriorating situations in Ethiopia and Ukraine

Although acute food insecurity estimates covering 2021 and 2022 in Ethiopia and Ukraine are not strictly comparable due to different methodologies, both countries experienced deteriorating food security. In **Ethiopia**, the cumulative effects of **conflict, drought conditions** and **macroeconomic challenges** resulted in an increase in the acutely food-insecure population requiring humanitarian assistance from 16.8 million people in 2021 to **20.4 million people in 2022** (FSIN & GNAFC, May 2022; OCHA, July 2022).

In **Ukraine**, the 2021 analysis only covered the two oblasts of Donetsk and Luhanska, where over 383 000 people were reportedly moderately or severely food insecure, according to WFP CARI methodology. In contrast, an April 2022 FEWS NET analysis conducted two months after the start of the war indicated that an estimated **2.5–4.99 million people** were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) at the national level at that time, with **greatest concern** for acute food insecurity among households in **urban areas under siege**. (FEWS NET, April 2022). With active fighting now concentrated to the eastern and southern areas, the situation on the ground is now different and **the food security situation may have changed**.

MAP 2

### Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories in 2022



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.


Source: FSIN, GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.

## Three countries have more than 50 percent of their analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above

When comparing the 45 countries/territories with data in 2021 and 2022, the share of the population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent increased from 20 percent to 21 percent. This occurred in the context of a 12 percent increase in the analysed population across the 45 countries/territories.


As in the GRFC 2022, eight countries had at least 30 percent of their analysed population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2022 (see figure 4). Crisis or worse increases have been recorded in **Somalia** and **Kenya** since the publication of the GRFC 2022 (see figure 5). Other countries that faced increases were **Mauritania** (9 percentage points), **Benin** and **Yemen** (6 percentage points), **Malawi** (5 percentage points), and **Guatemala**, **South Sudan** and the **Sudan** (3 percentage points).

**FIGURE 4**  
Eight countries have at least 30 percent of their analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above in 2022



In Jordan, 65% of the Syrian refugee analysed population was moderately to severely food insecure in March 2022 (WFP CARI). This figure is based on a revised CARI methodology. For more information, see Technical Notes. Additionally, in southwest Angola, 58% of the analysed population was in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in early 2022. Only 9% of the total country population was analysed.


**FIGURE 5**  
Three countries had strong increases in the analysed population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above between 2021 and 2022



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH; GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.

MAP 3

## Share of analysed populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories in 2022



Percentages of the analysed populations (ranges) in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.


Source: FSIN, GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.

## Four countries have populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in 2022

In May 2022, the IPC projected that by June–September, **over 213 000 people in Somalia** would be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the regions of Bay, Banadir, Mudug, Hiraan, Bakool, Lower Shabelle and Nugaal. **In Yemen**, by the second half of 2022, **around 161 000 people** were projected to be in this phase, representing the highest levels recorded by the IPC in the country, while several areas were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In **South Sudan**, during April–July 2022, **87 000 people** were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity states. During March–May 2022 in **Afghanistan**, around **20 300 people** were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Ghor province due to the disruption of humanitarian food assistance in March, which coincided with the peak of the lean season, when most households had depleted their food stocks from the previous harvest.<sup>8</sup>

FIGURE 6

**In 2022, over 481 500 people are forecast to be in IPC Phase 5 in four countries**



\*IPC Phase 5 estimates for Somalia were based on the May 2022 analysis and do not reflect the findings from the August/September TWG/FRC analysis.

In 2021 and 2022, there were no populations in Catastrophe in CH countries. Disaggregated data for Ethiopia were not available for 2022.

Source: FSIN, using IPC data.

The 2022 estimate for populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in GRFC countries is lower than in 2021, when 570 000 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), including 401 000 people in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. **Disaggregated data** by acute food insecurity phase were **not available for Ethiopia in 2022** and are thus not reported, but it is **likely the situation has worsened since 2021**.

<sup>8</sup> These findings do not coincide with the period that included the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2022, which took place during November 2021–March 2022.

### Famine projected in Somalia and Risk of Famine in Yemen

In September 2022, the Somalia IPC TWG and IPC FRC reported that in south-central Somalia, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is projected in two areas in the Bay region (rural areas of Baidoa and Burhakaba districts and newly arrived IDPs in Baidoa).<sup>9</sup> It will most likely occur in these two districts between October–December 2022 and persist until at least March 2023. The last time Somalia experienced Famine (IPC Phase 5) was in 2011.

This extreme situation is the result of the unprecedented failure of four consecutive rainy seasons, decades of conflict, severe economic shocks and mass population displacement.

These catastrophic food security outcomes are expected to occur in the absence of significant humanitarian assistance, based on the highly likely fifth failed rainy season during October–December, and worsening displacement and health crises as extreme drought contributes to growing IDP numbers in already overcrowded IDP settlements. The persistently high food prices against the backdrop of high global food prices will render food inaccessible for many. Continued conflict could impact the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance.

For more information on these findings and recommended actions to avert Famine (IPC Phase 5), see the reports developed by the IPC FRC and TWG, September 2022.

<sup>9</sup> Famine is classified by the IPC according to an internationally accepted standard based on three criteria: area level outcome where at least 20 percent of the population face extreme lack of food; at least 30 percent of children suffer from wasting; and two people for every 10 000 are dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease. For more information, see the GRFC 2022 Technical notes, page 37.

According to FEWS NET, in June 2022, **households in Tigray likely faced extreme difficulty accessing food** due to the conflict, which has caused widespread market and livelihood disruptions and rendered many households reliant on humanitarian food assistance and markets during a time when income levels are low and food prices high. This resulted in **widespread Emergency**



© WFP/GENEVA COSTOPULOS

**IDPs in Horseed camp, Shabelle Hoose region, Somalia – one of the places the drought has hit hardest.**

In June–December 2022, a **Risk of Famine** was forecast in **Yemen** under the worst-case scenario in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah governorate. Further assessments were recommended in Midi and Haradh districts to ascertain the situation due to insufficient evidence. In Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate, a Risk of Famine was not identified during the forecast period, but it was determined that if a worst-case scenario materialised for a protracted period beyond the projection period, these districts would likely shift into Famine (IPC, March 2022).

**(IPC Phase 4) outcomes** in several areas classified in this phase, while the worst-affected households likely faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Based on FEWS NET assumptions of continued conflict from October onward, high numbers of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will likely persist, with some households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (FEWS NET, June 2022).


## High numbers of people in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) or above

### Acute food insecurity remains of concern across IPC/CH countries/territories in 2022<sup>10</sup>

The 38.6 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 34 countries represents a smaller number of people in this phase of acute food insecurity than in 2021 because of the smaller number of countries covered. Disaggregated data were not available in 2022 for major crises including Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.<sup>11</sup> Six countries all had over 2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in 2022 (see figure 7).

FIGURE 7

**In 2022, ten countries/territories were forecast to have at least one million people each in IPC Phase 4**



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data, GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.


<sup>10</sup> This GRFC 2022 Mid-year Update includes four estimates for up to 10.7 million people in four countries where data were provided by FEWS NET, which does not provide a breakdown of figures by IPC/CH Phases of acute food insecurity. Phase disaggregation was also not available for numbers based on WFP CARI methodology (Iraq and Jordan (Syrian refugees) and HNO/HRP figures (Ethiopia)). Therefore, the sum of the populations detailed in IPC/CH Phases 3–5 will not add up to 201.4M–205.1 million people.

<sup>11</sup> In 2021, these countries accounted for around 5.1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Some 134.2 million people were reported in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) across 39 countries in 2022 – more than the 133.1 million people reported in 41 countries in 2021. The highest numbers of people in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria (21 States and the FCT), Afghanistan, Yemen and the Sudan (see figure 8). Another eight countries have at least 3 million people in this phase during their peak period in 2022.

FIGURE 8

**In 2022, a total of over 94 million people were forecast to be in IPC Phase 3 in ten countries/territories**



Source: FSIN, using IPC and CH data, GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.

Around 236.5 million people were in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 39 countries, while 236.2 million people in 41 countries were reported in this phase in 2021. Approximately half of these people were in only four countries – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria (21 States and the FCT), the Sudan, and Afghanistan.



© WFP/SHEER AHU

On 22 June, a 5.9 magnitude earthquake hit Paktika and Khost provinces in Afghanistan. On 18 July a second 5.1 magnitude earthquake struck the same area.

# Spotlights on two key topics of concern in mid-2022

## Global and domestic food prices

Before the onset of war in Ukraine in February 2022, global food commodity prices were at a ten-year high due to the economic effects of COVID-19 (see figure 9). The impact of the war further increased global food prices, and although international reference prices for food commodities started decreasing in the second quarter of 2022, prices were still 7.9 percent higher year-on-year in August 2022 (FAO, September 2022).

FAO's July 2022 *Crop Prospects and Food Situation* report states that across the world, rising food and overall inflation have worsened food security conditions, particularly in low-income food-deficit countries, while elevated prices of agricultural inputs could limit their use and lead to lower yields in 2022 (FAO, July 2022).


In late July 2022, the Black Sea Grain Initiative agreements to allow shipments to resume through the Black Sea offered some hope of lowering global food prices and diminishing threats to food security in vulnerable and/or import-dependent countries. If the initiative holds, the return of Ukrainian exports to the global market will increase global supplies of wheat and other agricultural products, but it is unlikely to fully restore inventories as the quantities being exported remain low. Food prices are thus projected to remain volatile (IFPRI, July 2022).

While world wheat prices fell by 14.5 percent between June and July 2022, partly in reaction to the agreement, as well as seasonal availability from harvests in the northern hemisphere, they were still 25 percent above July 2021 values (FAO, August 2022).

Under an agreement with Türkiye, the Russian Federation received assurances that its exports of food and fertilizer would not be affected by export sanctions. If the agreement contributes to lower prices on global markets, it could help mitigate the affordability challenge faced by most low-income countries today (IFPRI, July 2022). Nonetheless, according to the World Bank, the war in Ukraine has altered global patterns of trade, production and

FIGURE 9

### Global drivers of increasing food prices in countries/territories in food crisis, March 2020 (start of COVID-19 pandemic)–March 2022 (start of war in Ukraine)



#### Percentage increase in the price of staple foods between March 2020 and March 2022

<0% 0–25% 25–50% 50–100% >100% Data unavailable

Source: FSIN, GRFC 2022 Mid-Year Update.

consumption of commodities in ways that will keep prices at historically high levels through to the end of 2024 (WB, April 2022) (see figure 10).

#### Countries already in food crisis face great risks

In the first months following the invasion, the GRFC 2022 countries/territories that were most vulnerable to worsening acute food insecurity triggered by food price increases tended to be those that are highly dependent on imported commodities such as wheat, fuel, cooking oil and fertilizer from

the Black Sea countries; have diets that are tilted towards those with the largest food price gains (wheat and maize); and have low economic resilience to respond to food price shocks.

Out of the 53 countries/territories in food crisis in 2021 (GRFC 2022, May 2022), the countries with the biggest increases in the cost of a food basket<sup>12</sup> were: Zimbabwe, the Sudan, Zambia and Mozambique

<sup>12</sup> The price of a typical food basket is based on meeting a population's energy and nutrition requirements. Its size and composition varies according to local preferences, demographic profile, activity levels, climatic conditions etc.

## Global and domestic food prices *continued*

FIGURE 10

### How the war in Ukraine aggravated food price rises in early 2022



**Shortfalls in food commodity export supplies due to reduced exports from Ukraine and blockades of major Ukrainian maritime ports in the Black Sea region**

- ❗ This had direct impacts on countries that depend highly on grain and cooking oil imports from the region – especially GRFC 2022 countries/ territories in food crisis, including **Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen**
- ❗ This also had a direct impact on global food prices. Supply shortfalls in global grain and sunflower seed and oil markets – before the war, Ukraine and the Russian Federation together supplied 30 percent of globally traded wheat, 20 percent of maize and 70 percent of sunflower oil (WFP, June 2022) – kept international prices elevated, even as other major producing countries expanded their exports.



Reduced oil supplies from traditional sources increased oil prices further and raised the costs of food production, agriculture, and transport.



Global fertilizer prices, already high, rose further due to supply disruptions caused by logistical and financial challenges. Rising prices of fossil fuels exacerbated the rise in fertilizer costs, as fertilizer production is energy intensive and natural gas is a key input for nitrogen-based fertilizers.



Shipping costs increased globally due to high energy costs and supply chain bottlenecks, as well as due to increased insurance costs for vessels sailing into the Black Sea.



Export restrictions imposed by key grain, fertilizer, and cooking oil-producing countries, including the Russian Federation, India, China and Indonesia, contributed to price increases in the short term (WB, August 2022).

(comparing the average for April–June 2022 with the previous three-month average) (WFP, August 2022).

The war in Ukraine is exacerbating the macroeconomic crises that most of the 53 GRFC 2022 countries/territories are already facing. These challenges are characterized by high inflation, strong currency depreciation, low foreign exchange reserves, high external debt, and limited fiscal space even before the impact of the war in Ukraine.

Many are still struggling to recover from the socioeconomic effects of COVID-19 restrictions and/or are experiencing conflict/

insecurity, which disrupts trade, transport, agricultural activities and livelihoods (FSIN, May 2022).

Most food-crisis countries have high food import dependence and weak capacity to insulate their populations against imported food inflation due to low foreign currency reserves and/or depreciating national currency. They lack the capacity to expand social protection and other means to support vulnerable populations. In addition, many are witnessing high general price inflation (also pushed up by the cost of energy and other basic needs), further eroding the purchasing power of affected populations.

### Ongoing challenges to global food prices in 2022

#### Weather conditions

Weather extremes raise concerns regarding food production prospects in 2022. Hot and dry conditions in the northern hemisphere have curbed winter wheat yields in several major producing regions. Global maize output is also forecast to fall below last year's level. Tight international wheat and maize markets mean prices will remain volatile and continue to be highly sensitive to daily news on crop development, weather conditions and policy changes (AMIS, August 2022).

#### Prices of key inputs

Increasing prices of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs translate into higher production costs and eventually into higher food prices. This could also lead to lower use of inputs, decreasing yields and harvests in the 2022/23 season and risking further price hikes (FAO, June 2022).

#### Potential supply gaps

FAO simulations carried out at the end of February 2022 indicate that if the war keeps crude oil prices high and continues to limit exports from Ukraine and the Russian Federation beyond the 2022/23 season, a considerable supply gap would remain in global grain and sunflower seed markets. Even as other exporting countries expand their output in response to the higher output prices, their capacity to do so may also be constrained by high production and input costs (FAO, June 2022).

#### Protectionist policies

The ripple effects of the war in Ukraine have also contributed to protectionist trade policies, with many countries implementing measures to curb the export of key food commodities in response to domestic food security concerns between March and June 2022. As of July, 21 countries had implemented food export bans, and six had implemented export-limiting measures (IFPRI, August 2022). Further escalation of trade restrictions by any of the top exporters of wheat is likely to push global wheat prices up again, with knock-on effects on international prices of other grains (WB, July 2022).

## Drought in the Horn of Africa

In 2022, the number of acutely food-insecure people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in **Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia** was expected to reach 31.8 million due to a confluence of conflict/insecurity, weather extremes and macroeconomic shocks.<sup>13</sup>

Within this, **18.8–21.3 million people** were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent primarily due to the severe, multi-seasonal drought in these three countries. Of these, between 7.4–9.9 million were in southern and south-eastern Ethiopia (OCHA, August 2022), 7.1 million were in Somalia (IPC, June 2022) and 4.4 million were in northern and eastern Kenya (IPC, forthcoming).

**On 5 September 2022, the IPC FRC projected Famine (IPC Phase 5) in south-central Somalia** (Baidoa and Burhakaba districts (rural) and for the newly arrived IDPs in Baidoa settlements. It will most likely occur in these two districts between October–December 2022 and persist until at least March 2023 (IPC FRC, September 2022). For more information see page 22.

The four-season drought started in late 2020 and is the region's most extensive, persistent and severe in over 40 years. The effects on pastoral and agropastoral areas of the Horn of Africa are particularly severe in Somalia, where 213 180 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the May 2022 IPC analysis, while parts of southern and central areas were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, June 2022).

There is a high likelihood that the rainy season in October–December 2022 will be below average, setting the stage for a record-breaking five-season drought. If this occurs, the number of people requiring urgent humanitarian assistance due to the drought by February 2023 is projected to increase from 18.8–21.3 million to **23–26 million people across the three countries** and the severity of acute food insecurity is expected to deepen within already food-insecure populations unless humanitarian assistance is urgently scaled up (FSNWG, July 2022).

<sup>13</sup> Data on Ethiopia are based on the 2022 HRP, while data on Somalia and Kenya are based on IPC analyses from May and July 2022 (the latter is forthcoming).

### Deteriorating livestock conditions, deaths and declining livestock prices

In pastoral areas, widespread water scarcity and vegetation deficits have reduced milk production and led to the excess death of significant numbers of livestock since the onset of drought. While difficult to estimate, sources report that over 9.2 million livestock had died by July 2022, including 3.8 million in southern Ethiopia (FSNWG, July 2022), 2.4 million in Kenya (NDMA, June 2022), and over 3.0 million in Somalia (IPC, June 2022). Water points and pastures were expected to be depleted earlier than usual during the July–September dry season, exacerbating below-average livestock body conditions and further reducing milk production (WFP, August 2022). Many displaced rural households have lost or sold most or all their livestock, representing a major threat to pastoralist food security and livelihoods.

### Below-average seasonal crop production

Rainfall deficits during the March–May 2022 Gu/long rains season were the most severe in at least 40 years. The drought has led to major reductions in crop production due to poor rains, displacement of households from their farms to urban areas, and farmers' reduced ability to afford seeds and other inputs or irrigate due to low river levels. In agropastoral and riverine areas of Somalia, the Gu cereal harvest was expected to be 40–60 percent below average – the country's fifth consecutive below-average harvest (FAO, August 2022). In Kenya, national maize crop production for the 2022 long rains is projected to be 20 percent below the five-year average (IPC, forthcoming).

### High staple food prices and reduced purchasing power

The consecutive below-average harvests have contributed to high staple food prices in drought-affected areas. In Somalia, prices for white maize and red sorghum have exhibited mixed trends in recent months but remain high, as have prices for imported food items. For example, vegetable oil prices have more than doubled in some markets relative to the previous year, limiting food accessibility for vulnerable populations (WFP, August 2022). At the same time, decreasing demand for agricultural labour and limited crop sales have reduced household income and purchasing power,



© WFP/MICHAEL TENELDE

**Millions of livestock – which pastoralist families rely upon for sustenance and livelihoods – have died across southern and south-eastern Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.**

further limiting food access for drought-affected households (FSNWG, July 2022). The terms of trade of livestock to cereal prices has declined starkly owing to the combination of general food price inflation and deteriorating livestock quality, limiting food access for pastoral households (FAO, July 2022).

### Increased human displacement

In Ethiopia and Somalia, more than 1.5 million drought-affected people have been displaced and migrated in search of water, pasture, or humanitarian assistance since late 2020 (IOM,



## Drought in the Horn of Africa *continued*

July 2022). By August, more than 755 000 people had been internally displaced in Somalia because of the effects of severe and consecutive drought in 2022, bringing the total figure to 1 million people since January 2021 (UNHCR & the Norwegian Refugee Council, August 2022). In Ethiopia, more than half a million drought-affected people have been displaced, more than 50 percent of whom had already been displaced before during previous droughts, reflecting the protracted nature of drought-induced displacement. Over 344 000 people in Ethiopia's Somali and southern Oromia regions were displaced between October 2021 and mid-April 2022 (WFP, July 2022).

### Resource-based conflicts have increased in drought-affected areas

In Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) counties, pastoralists are trekking longer distances to find water and pasture for livestock, leading to increased resource-based and intercommunal tensions and conflict (FAO, July 2022).

### Deteriorating nutrition situation




**6.1M** children under 5 years are forecast to be **wasted** in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia in 2022

**1.8M** of them are forecast to be **severely wasted**


Source: FSNWG, July 2022.

FIGURE 11  
Number of wasted children in Kenya and Somalia, 2021 and 2022, and Ethiopia, 2022



Source: IPC AMN Kenya and Somalia; Nutrition Sector Kenya and UNICEF Ethiopia.

MAP 4  
IPC acute malnutrition situation in Kenya, August–November 2021




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Kenya IPC AMN Technical Working Group, September 2021.

The number of wasted children in the Horn of Africa increased in 2022 (see figure 11) driven mainly by worsening drought-related acute food insecurity as well as ongoing conflict, disease outbreaks, and persistent low routine immunization coverage.

Between January and June 2022, 568 000 children had already been admitted for SAM treatment where those services exist in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, up significantly compared to recent years (FSNWG, July 2022). Of the 6.1 million children projected to suffer from wasting or acute malnutrition at some point during 2022, most are in Ethiopia followed by Somalia and Kenya. Of these children, close to 1.8 million face severe wasting, of whom 1.2 million are in Ethiopia (UNICEF Ethiopia, June 2022; IPC AMN Somalia, June 2022; Nutrition Cluster Kenya, July 2022).

MAP 5  
IPC acute malnutrition situation in Kenya, July–September 2022



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Kenya IPC AMN Technical Working Group, September 2022.

The number of drought-affected people in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia without reliable access to safe water rose from 9.5 million in February to 16.2 million in July, putting children and their families in increased danger of contracting illnesses like cholera and diarrhoea. In Somalia, the number of acute watery diarrhoea and cholera cases doubled between January and June 2021 and 2022. In Kenya, over 90 percent of open water sources – such as ponds and open wells – in drought-affected areas are either depleted or dried up, posing a serious risk of disease outbreak (UNICEF, August 2022). Drought is also adversely affecting access and availability of facility-based health services due to lack of water, poor sanitation, and population displacement (FSNWG, July 2022).

## Drought in the Horn of Africa: deteriorating nutrition *continued*

### Ethiopia

The nutrition situation continued to deteriorate in Ethiopia with over 1.2 million children projected to need treatment for SAM, a 30 percent increase from the previous projections (representing 60 percent of the overall Horn of Africa burden) (UNICEF, July 2022). Ethiopia admitted nearly 323 800 severely wasted children where services were available between January and June 2022, with an average of over 50 000 admissions each month, with SNNP, Somali and Afar regions registering the highest numbers. Nutrition assessments using Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) conducted from August 2021 to March 2022, found that 77 percent of the woredas in Afar, Tigray, Oromia, and Somali regions had 'very high' proxy Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of above 15 percent (FSNWG, July 2022).


### Kenya

During July–October 2022, a Critical (IPC Phase 4) nutrition situation persisted in most arid areas, with an Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) situation reported in Turkana North (38.6 percent) and Turkana South and East (41.4 percent), according to surveys conducted in July 2022. In Marsabit, the percentage of children who are wasted increased by 7–10 percentage points between June/July 2021 and the same period in 2022, reaching 30 percent in North Horr and Laisamis.

Around 884 500 children were expected to be wasted, 223 000 of them experiencing SAM in July–October 2022. Around 116 000 pregnant or lactating women were also in need of treatment for acute malnutrition. These figures are slightly lower than March–June 2022 when around 942 000 children were expected to be wasted, 229 000 of them severely so, and around 134 000 pregnant or lactating women were in need of treatment for acute malnutrition. However, they were higher than July–November 2021 (GAM: 653 000, SAM: 143 000, pregnant or lactating women: 96 500) overall admissions for SAM in the first four months of the year were 64 percent higher than the same period in 2021 (IPC, forthcoming).

MAP 6

### IPC acute malnutrition situation in Somalia, September–November 2021



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Somalia IPC AMN Technical Working Group, September 2021.


### Somalia

The nutrition situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. In May 2022, nearly 1.5 million children under 5 years were projected to suffer from wasting at some point during 2022, up from the February estimate of 1.4 million and the November 2021 estimate of 1.2 million. Of these 386 400 children were estimated to be severely wasted, an increase of 173 000 children compared to the period August 2021–July 2022 (IPC AMN, November 2021). These figures are expected to increase further. SAM admissions among children under 5 years rose by 46 percent in January–April 2022 compared to the same period last year, and many areas in the central and southern parts of the country were classified as Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).

In Bay Agropastoral (Burhakaba and Baidoa districts), the crude death rate reached the Emergency threshold of 1 in 10 000 people.

MAP 7

### IPC acute malnutrition situation in Somalia, May 2022



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Somalia IPC AMN Technical Working Group, June 2022.

The under 5 death rate reached the Emergency (IPC Phase 4) threshold in Bay Agropastoral (Baidoa district) (IPC, June 2022).

The prevalence of wasting deteriorated between December 2021 and April 2022 in 10 of the 11 areas for which comparable data are available. In Bay Agropastoral Livelihood Zone, the prevalence deteriorated significantly from 13.9 to 26.9 percent. There are concerns that the acute malnutrition situation in some districts within the Bay Agropastoral Livelihood Zone is worse than the overall prevalence for the whole livelihood zone. Although there have been additional surveys in August 2022 to assess the nutrition situation across Somalia, the results of these surveys are not available as of yet (IPC, August 2022).



# CHAPTER 2

REGIONAL OVERVIEWS OF FOOD CRISES

# Central and Southern Africa

Angola | Central African Republic | Democratic Republic of the Congo | Eswatini | Lesotho | Madagascar | Malawi | Mozambique | Namibia | United Republic of Tanzania | Zambia | Zimbabwe

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022

The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is higher in Madagascar, Malawi, and the United Republic of Tanzania than during the 2021 peak. Estimates for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and Zambia do not account for the effects of the war in Ukraine,<sup>14</sup> but lower harvests and rising food prices are expected to push up the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

**43.5–44.0M people** in 12 countries in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent


The aggregate number above includes a FEWS NET range estimate for Zimbabwe, which does not provide a breakdown by phase classification so estimates are not included with the disaggregated IPC data below.

**7.1M people** in nine countries in IPC Phase 4

**33.9M people** in 11 countries in IPC Phase 3

**72.8M people** in 11 countries in IPC Phase 2

FIGURE 12  
Number of people in 12 countries in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2021–2022



Source: FSIN, using IPC and FEWS NET (for Zimbabwe) data.

14 For Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia, no updates were available since May.

In Central and Southern Africa, **Malawi experienced the most significant increase in the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3)** between 2021 and 2022. The number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) was projected to rise by 45 percent between January–March 2021 and October 2022–March 2023 to 3.8 million people, representing 20 percent of the analysed population.

**Madagascar’s Grand Sud and Est regions were forecast to experience a 26 percent increase** between the 2021 and 2022 peak periods **despite food assistance**,<sup>15</sup> with the population in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity anticipated to increase to nearly 2.1 million people, or 39 percent of the analysed population. Southern regions of the country continued to face drought conditions in 2022, which destroyed crops, affected livestock and hindered access to food in the Grand Sud, contributing to around 285 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, May 2022). However, the analysed population also increased between the 2021 and 2022 peaks, which may account in part for rising numbers.<sup>16</sup>

Populations in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, and Zambia** in 2022 were not expected to surpass 2021 levels, but the **numbers remain high at 25.9 million** (25 percent of the population and including 5.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)), 2.2 million (45 percent of the population, with 638 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)) and 1.6 million, respectively.


Although the 2021 and 2022 peak estimates for **Zimbabwe** are not directly comparable given the use of IPC and FEWS NET analyses, the **population in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity is expected to remain high** in September–December

15 Planned humanitarian food assistance was expected to reach at least 23 percent of households during April–August (IPC, May 2022).

16 For more information, see Technical notes discussing comparability of estimates.

FIGURE 13

## Numbers and share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022 (includes IPC Phase 2 numbers, where available)



The Madagascar analysis only covered the Grand Sud/Est region and analysed 18 percent of the total country population; the United Republic of Tanzania analysed 6 percent; Angola, 9 percent; Mozambique, 47 percent and Zambia, 66 percent. All other analyses covered between 70–100% of the country population.

Source: FSIN, using IPC and FEWS NET (for Zimbabwe) data.

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022 *continued*

2022, taking into account the compounding effects of the war in Ukraine.<sup>17</sup>

The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) recorded in **Angola remained stable** in 2021 and 2022 at 1.6 million, including 417 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), given the same analysis covered October 2021–March 2022 and was used as the peak estimate in both years.

Acute food insecurity estimates for **Mozambique** were not fully comparable between 2021 and 2022 due to differences in the analysed population.<sup>18</sup>

In **Namibia**, the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) was **projected to remain stable** at around 750 000 (30 percent of the analysed population), given the 2021 peak analysis was valid for late 2021 and early 2022.

In **Eswatini**, the population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is expected to persist at similar levels between the 2021 and 2022 lean seasons at around 340 000 (29 percent of the analysed population), which represents the peak for both years.

Given that the estimates for Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia are based on analyses conducted before or around the beginning of the war in Ukraine, these figures do not fully capture the economic consequences of the war.

### Key drivers

#### \* Conflict/insecurity

In the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, ongoing conflicts triggered new population displacements, resulting in localized disruption of agriculture and livelihoods. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence and related displacement in the eastern provinces


<sup>17</sup> In late August 2022, FEWS NET's estimate for Zimbabwe was revised upwards to 3.0–3.5 million for the September–December period. This revision was not incorporated into this report's Mid-Year aggregate figure as it was issued after the cut-off date for data inclusion.

<sup>18</sup> For more information, see Technical notes discussing comparability of estimates.

FIGURE 14

### Percentage change in cost of a food basket

April–June 2022 average versus five-year average for that period



No data are available for Angola or Zambia.

Source: WFP Global Market Monitor August 2022.

of North and South Kivu and Ituri affected harvesting of the 2022 secondary season maize crops and land preparation for the 2022 main season maize crops (FAO, July 2022). In Mozambique, conflict in Cabo Delgado resulted in an additional 161 944 IDPs between February and June, including in previously conflict-free areas of Ancuabe and Chiúre districts (IOM, June 2022; IOM, July 2022).

#### \* Economic shocks, including COVID-19

While prices of domestically produced staples declined seasonally in the second quarter of 2022, they remain elevated and higher than in 2021 across most of the region. The seasonal decrease in prices during the harvest was lower than average, partly offset by the upward pressure exerted by high global food and fuel prices. High international prices and continued depreciation of national currencies – especially in Malawi, Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent Madagascar – contributed to below-average household purchasing power, notably among households who were atypically market

reliant in the post-harvest period (FEWS NET, July 2022). Steep currency depreciation in Zimbabwe has increased the spill-over effects of high global prices at a time when food import needs have risen due to a lower agricultural output in 2022.

Elevated prices of agricultural inputs, further exacerbated by the consequences of the war in Ukraine, had a negligible influence on agricultural production in 2022 as the season was nearing its end. Continued high input prices, particularly of fertilizers, could limit their use and have adverse impacts on agricultural production in 2023 (FAO, July 2022).

#### \* Weather extremes

Erratic and inadequate cumulative rainfall resulted in below-average cereal production in Zambia and Zimbabwe in 2022. Crops in Madagascar, Mozambique and to a lesser extent Zambia and Zimbabwe were damaged by tropical cyclones and storms. In Madagascar and Malawi, although national cereal outputs in 2022 are expected to remain above the five-year average on account of generally conducive weather conditions in the main producing regions, in the highly food-insecure southern regions of both countries, households suffered poor agricultural seasons (a sixth consecutive in Madagascar) due to drought conditions in 2022. Harvests of major food crops were expected at low levels (FAO, July 2022).

# East Africa

Burundi | Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Rwanda (refugees)† | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda


## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022

Regional drought, conflict/insecurity and economic shocks – including the effects of the war in Ukraine – led to a sharp deterioration in acute food insecurity. On 5 September, the Somalia IPC TWG and IPC FRC projected Famine (IPC Phase 5) in two districts of Somalia. South Sudan was also forecast to have populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Disaggregated information is not available for Ethiopia, but populations are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

**54.6–55.1M people** in eight countries in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent

The aggregate number includes an HRP figure for Ethiopia and a FEWS NET range estimate for Uganda. They do not provide a breakdown by phase classification so estimates for Ethiopia and Uganda are not included with the disaggregated IPC data below.

FIGURE 15  
Number of people in six\* countries in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2021–2022



\* Countries with data in both years: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda.

Source: FSIN, using IPC, HRP (for Ethiopia 2022) and FEWS NET (for Uganda) data.

**300 180 people** in Somalia and South Sudan in IPC Phase 5

**9.3M people** in five countries in IPC Phase 4

**22.5M people** in six countries in IPC Phase 3

**33.2M people** in six countries in IPC Phase 2

The population in IPC Phase 5 in Somalia is based on the May 2022 IPC analysis.

Source: FSIN, using IPC data.


In East Africa, the food security situation has experienced a dramatic deterioration in Somalia. Based on the May 2022 IPC analysis, the population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October–December 2021 and June–September 2022 is projected to increase by 104 percent to 7.1 million people (45 percent of the national population). Around 213 000 people are forecast to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Over 2.1 million people are projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and several areas have been classified in this phase, which entails very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality.

Based on an August/September IPC analysis, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is projected in two areas of Somalia's Bay region. It will most likely occur between October–December 2022 and persist until the next update in March 2023 (IPC FRC, September 2022). This projection assumes an absence of humanitarian assistance. It reflects the likelihood of a fifth failed rainy season and drought conditions that have contributed to a significant decline in crop production, widespread livestock emaciation and death; a notable reduction in household purchasing power, alongside exceptionally high food prices; and ongoing conflict and insecurity (FSNAU & FEWS NET, May 2022). For more information and recommended actions to avert Famine (IPC Phase 5), see Somalia IPC FRC and TWG September 2022 reports.

Between November 2021–January 2022 and October–December 2022, the population facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Kenya's rural ASALs increased by 84 percent, reaching nearly 4.4 million people and including over 1.2 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In July/August it was projected that during October–December, 29 percent of the analysed population would be in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity – an increase of 13 percentage points from November 2021–January 2022. This escalation stems primarily from the failure of the March–May

FIGURE 16

## Numbers and share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022 (includes IPC Phase 2 numbers, where available)



HRP and FEWS NET do not provide data disaggregated by phase.

Source: FSIN, using IPC, HRP (for Ethiopia) and FEWS NET (range estimate for Uganda) data.

“long rains” season, the fourth consecutive below-average rainy season, which resulted in widespread animal deaths in northern and north-eastern pastoral areas, estimated at 2.4 million, and crop failures, particularly in south-eastern, coastal and marginal agriculture areas where cropping is particularly important. Other drivers of acute food insecurity are economic shocks, including the ripple impacts of the war in Ukraine, as well as conflict and insecurity. The October–December 2022 projection for Kenya is

† No data were available for refugee populations in Rwanda in 2022.

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022 *continued*

based on a most-likely scenario, which assumes that **the short rains will culminate in an unprecedented fifth consecutive below-average season across most of the ASALs** in this period, leading to a further deterioration in grazing and water resources, additional livestock deaths, and below-average crop production. Diminished food production and rising fuel and transport prices are expected to maintain inflationary pressure on staple food prices (IPC, forthcoming).

Although different methodologies were used to produce Ethiopia's 2021 and 2022 peak estimates, **acute food insecurity levels are increasing** due to the combined effects of the conflict in Tigray and neighbouring regions, severe drought conditions in the southwest and southern regions of SNNP, Oromia and Somali, and persistent macroeconomic challenges, including insufficient foreign currency reserves, the continued depreciation of the national currency, sustained food and non-food inflation. These difficulties are exacerbated by the ripple effects of the Ukraine war, which triggered hikes in wheat, fuel and fertilizer prices. The latest HRP estimated that 20.4 million people would be acutely food insecure and require urgent humanitarian assistance in 2022,<sup>19</sup> up from the IPC's estimate of 16.8 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) during May–June 2021 (OCHA, July 2022).

In the **Sudan**, the **number of people expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse has increased to over 11.6 million** in June–September 2022, an increase of 1.9 million compared to the 2021 peak. This includes 3.1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This forecast assumes that the macroeconomic crisis continues with further currency depreciation and accelerating inflation, and that the lean season sets in earlier than usual because of the poor 2021/2022 cereal harvest. This situation may be worse if international wheat, fuel and fertilizer prices remain high or surge again due to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine (IPC, June 2022).<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> This estimate was primarily based on HEA assessments, using survival deficit thresholds in line with IPC Phase 3 or above; WFP EFSA data for Tigray, using the CARI methodology; and expert judgements of selected areas using DTM monitoring and village-level assessments.

<sup>20</sup> It should be noted that the number of people analysed between the 2021 April–May peak period and the October 2022–February 2023 analysis period increased from 46.7 million to 47.9 million, which could in part account for rising acute food insecurity numbers (IPC, May 2022).

In **South Sudan**, the number of people projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2022 was **projected to increase by 8 percent** relative to 2021 levels, to 7.7 million people during April–July 2022, including 87 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and nearly 2.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This projection was based on the combined effects of conflict and insecurity, population displacements, weather and economic shocks, a poor 2021 harvest with an ensuing high cereal deficit and years of asset depletion and livelihood losses (IPC, April 2022).

### Key drivers

#### Weather extremes

The drought that started in October 2020 has been the most extensive and persistent in the Horn of Africa since 1981, damaging livelihoods and incurring debilitating, repeated cumulative shocks to herds, crops, water availability and household incomes in southern and southeastern Ethiopia, northern and eastern Kenya, and Somalia. (FEWS NET, June 2022, WFP, August 2022) (see the spotlight on drought in the Horn of Africa, page 16). Eastern and northern areas of Uganda, including Karamoja, as well as Djibouti and equatorial South Sudan have also been affected by drought. In June 2022, South Sudan suffered the worst floods recorded for that time of the year (WFP, June 2022). In Ethiopia, flooding across vast areas is expected to affect more than 1.7 million people during the June–September rainy season (OCHA, July 2022).


#### Conflict/insecurity

Persistent conflict/insecurity continues to disrupt livelihoods, agriculture, markets and flows of humanitarian assistance, and drives population displacement. The most-affected areas are Tigray and Amhara as well as Oromia, Benshangul/Gumuz, and Gambela regions in Ethiopia; south-central Somalia; Central and West Darfur in the Sudan; and Jonglei, Pibor, Lakes, Unity, Warrap and Western Equatoria in South Sudan. The prolonged drought has also increased competition over scarce pasture and water resources, leading to clashes among communities across affected areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

FIGURE 17

### Percentage change in cost of a food basket

April–June 2022 average versus five-year average for that period



No data are available for Kenya.

Source: WFP Global Market Monitor August 2022.

#### Economic shocks, including COVID-19

East African economies struggling to recover from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic were dealt a further blow by the economic repercussions of the war in Ukraine due to their reliance on wheat and cooking oil imports from Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and overall elevated global commodity prices. These global challenges, exacerbated by domestic cereal shortages and the impact of conflict on food supplies in some countries, have led to exceptionally high local food prices, while declining or stagnant economies throughout the region have eroded household purchasing power. In pastoralist areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, low livestock prices worsened terms of trade and purchasing power (WFP, August 2022).


Weakening domestic currencies – especially in Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan – have inflated the cost of food imports, energy and external public debt repayments. The region has limited capacity to address these shocks. Most countries are facing increased fiscal imbalances and rising public debt pressure, limiting the capacity of public-backed subsidies and social protection systems to address inflation pressure on the most vulnerable segments of the population (WFP, August 2022).

# West Africa and the Sahel

Benin | Burkina Faso | Cabo Verde† | Cameroon | Chad | Côte d'Ivoire | Gambia | Guinea | Guinea-Bissau | Liberia† | Libya† | Mali | Mauritania | Niger | Nigeria (21 states and FCT) | Senegal | Sierra Leone

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022

In 2022, the number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in West Africa and the Sahel is forecast to reach its highest point in the history of the GRFC. Compared to the 2021 peak figure, the population in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity in 14 countries with 2022 data are expected to increase by 41 percent to 40.92 million people. However, needs could be even higher, given that the latest round of the CH data in March 2022 did not account for the compounding economic implications of the war in Ukraine.


 **40.9M people** in 14 countries/territories in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above)

 **2.9M people** in 14 countries/territories in CH Phase 4

 **38.0M people** in 14 countries/territories in CH Phase 3

 **87.5M people** in 14 countries/territories in CH Phase 2

FIGURE 18  
Number of people in 14 countries/territories in CH Phase 3 or above, 2021–2022



Source: FSIN, using CH data.

† No data were available for Liberia and Libya in 2022. Although data were available for Cabo Verde in 2022 and was included in the GRFC 2022, the country was a data gap in 2021 and so was not included in this Update to facilitate comparisons between the two years.

Between October–December 2021 and June–August 2022, the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in Nigeria (21 states and the FCT) was forecast to increase by 50 percent to 19.5 million people – representing an additional 6.5 million people in these phases. This significant rise includes around 1.2 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and reflects the compounding impacts of continued conflict/insecurity, as well as economic shocks and weather extremes (CH, March 2022).


In the Niger, the number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) was projected to rise by 71 percent to 4.4 million year-on-year by June–August 2022.<sup>21</sup> Within this, the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) nearly tripled between 2021 and 2022 to 425 800 people. This worsening situation can be attributed to heightened conflict and related displacements and high food prices, while a poor 2021 rainy season was expected to affect supplies of key food staples in 2022.

Similarly, during the June–August 2022 lean season in Mali, acute food insecurity levels were forecast to increase by 41 percent, reaching 1.8 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 157 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). This is due to the compounding impact of conflict and related displacements, drought, and economic instability.

In Burkina Faso, the number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) was projected to increase by 20 percent to 3.5 million during June–August 2022 – the highest number in the country in the GRFC's history – due to persistent conflict and insecurity, crop production shortfalls and high food prices. This figure includes 628 000 people projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4). In Chad, the population in these phases is expected

<sup>21</sup> The share of the analysed population in these phases was forecast to rise from 10 percent to 18 percent of the population.

FIGURE 19  
Numbers and share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022 (includes IPC Phase 2 numbers, where available)



Source: CH.



## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022 *continued*

to increase by 18 percent to around 2.1 million, including 101 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) during the June–August 2022 lean season as a result of ongoing violence and related displacements, as well as the impacts of drought and economic shocks (CH, March 2022).

Five countries in this region saw an increase of over 75 percent in the number of people in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity. The most concerning increase was in Benin, which was expected to experience a 335 percent rise in the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) between June–August 2021 and March–May 2022 – reaching over 1.2 million people, or 9 percent of the analysed population.<sup>22</sup> In the Gambia and Mauritania, the number of people in these phases was forecast to increase by 82 percent, while Senegal and Guinea were projected to face increases of 81 and 78 percent, respectively. These increases are largely the result of economic shocks, which have contributed to steep food price hikes.

In Cameroon, the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) was expected to rise by 9 percent in March–May 2022 to nearly 2.9 million, including 254 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), stemming from conflict/insecurity, particularly in Anglophone areas, and high food prices (CH, March 2022).

### Key drivers


#### Conflict/insecurity

In 2021, increasing insecurity contributed to a decline in total cereal production in Sahelian countries (-11 percent compared to the five-year average) with a knock-on effect for 2022 (RPCA, 2022). Violence increased in the first quarter of 2022 in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger, and Nigeria, and in northern parts of Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire (FAO-GIEWS, May 2022). This intensification led to large-scale displacements, disrupting livelihoods and markets, as well as contributing to localized production shortfalls

<sup>22</sup> This increase stems partly to expanded population coverage in the analysis – from 72 percent to 100 percent between the two analysis periods, and partly from elevated food prices and reduced incomes due to the lingering socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

FIGURE 20

### Percentage change in cost of a food basket April–June 2022 average versus five-year average for that period



No data are available for Liberia or Senegal.

Source: WFP Global Market Monitor August 2022.

(FAO, July 2022). Insecurity and poor weather affected access to water and pasture across the Sahel, resulting in reduced livestock condition and production, and an early start to the 2022 pastoral lean season. It also caused abnormal livestock migration patterns, over-exploitation of accessible grazing areas and increased tensions between farmers and herders (FAO, July 2022).

#### Economic shocks, including COVID-19

Food prices continued to rise due to reduced production in 2021–22, high prices for agricultural inputs, and obstacles to regional trade, notably insecurity, COVID-19-related logistical bottlenecks, and cereal export bans in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Côte d'Ivoire. Currency depreciation in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, driven by trade

deficits and foreign exchange shortages, accelerated general price inflation (RPCA, July 2022; FAO, July 2022; FAO-GIEWS, May 2022).

Continued increases in global prices of staple foods, fuel, and agricultural inputs, exacerbated by the compounding effects of the war in Ukraine, placed further economic pressure on the region, although specific acute food insecurity outcomes were not available for this update. As figure 20 shows, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Burkina Faso experienced the biggest increases in food prices in April–June 2022 versus the five-year average (WFP, August 2022). Countries particularly vulnerable to increasing prices of fertilizers are Burkina Faso and Mali (RPCA, July 2022).

These trends are on top of pre-existing macroeconomic issues and the lingering economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic notably in Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and continue to increase fiscal deficits and debt levels, with a negative effect on the delivery of agricultural support and essential social services to vulnerable rural households (FAO-GIEWS, May 2022).

#### Weather extremes

Weather shocks in 2021, including frequent dry spells and floods, hampered cereal production in Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, Mauritania, and the Niger, resulting in reduced domestic food supplies in 2022 and increasing reliance on imports amid high global food prices. In Cabo Verde, the fifth consecutive year of severe drought conditions resulted in marginal levels of cereal production (FAO-GIEWS, May 2022).

Reduced and uneven distribution of rainfall between April and June 2022 in parts of Guinea-Bissau, northern Guinea, northcentral and north-eastern Nigeria, and southern Mali, led to below-average vegetation conditions in many cropped areas. Average to above-average rainfall amounts forecast for July–October 2022 across the Sahel and northern parts of coastal countries could benefit crop development where planted. In southern and central parts of coastal countries, the forecast for below-normal and erratic rainfall raises concerns about yields (FAO, July 2022).

# Eurasia

Europe | Ukraine | Middle East | Iraq | Palestine† | Syrian Arab Republic† | Syrian refugees in Egypt†, Jordan and Lebanon† | Yemen | South Asia | Afghanistan | Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar)† | Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh)

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022

Conflict primarily drove acute food insecurity in Eurasia, but declines in purchasing power due to rising commodity prices compounded the situation. Data gaps include Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar), Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic. Data available for Ukraine and Yemen project higher numbers of acutely food-insecure populations, while in Afghanistan and Pakistan, levels remain high.

**49.6–52.1M people** in six countries in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent

The aggregate number above includes a FEWS NET range estimate for Ukraine, and WFP CARI estimates for IDPs in Iraq and Syrian refugees in Jordan. They are not included with the disaggregated IPC data.






-  **161 000 people** in Yemen in IPC Phase 5
-  **16.9M people** in three countries in IPC Phase 4
-  **29.5M people** in three countries in IPC Phase 3
-  **26.1M people** in three countries in IPC Phase 2

FIGURE 21

**Number of people in four\* countries in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2021–2022**



\* Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ukraine and Yemen. Data for Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar), Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Syrian refugees in Egypt and Lebanon were not available for this update. Source: FSIN, using IPC and FEWS NET data (for Ukraine).

† No data were available for Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar), Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic or refugee populations in Egypt and Lebanon, in 2022.

Figures comparing the 2021 and 2022 peak periods in **Yemen projected an 18 percent increase in the number of people** in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), reaching over 19 million during June–December 2022, **including 161 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)** and 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>23</sup>

Although data covering 2021 and 2022 are not directly comparable for Ukraine due to different methodologies and geographical coverage, the onset of the war in **Ukraine** in February 2022 **likely led to a significant spike in acute food insecurity**. Prior to the conflict, an estimated 383 000 people were acutely food insecure and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in 2021 in Donetska and Luhanska oblasts (FSIN & GNAFC, May 2022).

A FEWS NET analysis in April 2022 indicated that, while acknowledging significant uncertainty about the situation, approximately 2.5–4.99 people were likely in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), with the greatest concern for households in urban areas under siege. However, it is likely the situation has changed and more up-to-date estimates were not available at the time of publication.


The highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in **Afghanistan** in both 2021 and 2022 was **22.8 million people, including 8.7 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)**.<sup>24</sup> Compared to the 2022 peak in early 2022, the number of people in these phases was projected to decline during March–May 2022 to 19.7 million due to a scale-up of humanitarian food assistance, accounting for 47 percent of the analysed population. This estimate

<sup>23</sup> Part of this increase is explained by a larger analysed population in 2022 relative to 2021. For additional information on comparability issues between the 2021 and 2022 estimates, see Technical Notes, page xx. This estimate does not include the latest information available on Yemen from August 2022, which was not yet available at the time of writing for this report.

<sup>24</sup> The same analysis was utilised for both estimates, covering November 2021–March 2022 during the lean season.

FIGURE 22

**Numbers and share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022** (includes IPC Phase 2 numbers, where available)



Source: FSIN, using IPC, FEWS NET (for Ukraine) and WFP CARI (Iraq, Syrian refugees in Jordan) data.

included 20 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Ghor province, who faced disruptions in humanitarian food assistance during March. Acute food insecurity estimates are expected to remain persistently high through the end of the year, with at least 18.9 million people projected to be in these phases during the harvest in June–November 2022, of which 6 million will be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, May 2022).

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022 *continued*

In **Pakistan**, nearly **4.7 million people** faced **Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above)** in April/May–June 2022 in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Sindh provinces, accounting for 26 percent of the analysed population. This figure included over 1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and reflected the impact of high food and fuel prices on poor households, as well as drought conditions in rain-fed areas of Balochistan and Sindh (IPC, January 2022). This late-2021 analysis did not account for potential effects of the war in Ukraine, or the August 2022 flooding.

### Key drivers

#### Conflict/insecurity


Although conflict levels and their impacts vary, protracted conflicts and insecurity continued to drive acute food insecurity in Afghanistan, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic (and Syrian refugee populations), Ukraine and Yemen through displacement, disruption to agricultural livelihoods and distribution via damage to infrastructure, food stocks and markets. Consequent food shortages and reductions in economic activities further exacerbated acute food insecurity outcomes to varying degrees. Conflict and insecurity in these countries and territories have also created severe humanitarian access challenges (ACAPS, July 2022).

Social, ethnic, and sectarian tensions continue to pose challenges to food security in Iraq along with devaluation of the Iraqi dinar and below-average levels of rainfall. The large numbers of IDPs and returnees are particularly vulnerable to experiencing acute food insecurity (OCHA, March 2022).

In Ukraine, the war has not only worsened food insecurity for populations in the eastern part of the country where hostilities have been ongoing since 2014, but it also undercut the rest of the population's purchasing power and significantly impacted livelihoods through displacement and disruption to economic activities. This has led to an increase in the number of households facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes (FAO, June 2022; FEWS NET, April 2022). The April 2022 analysis suggested households will likely face consumption gaps and Crisis

FIGURE 23

### Percentage change in cost of a food basket April–June 2022 average versus five-year average for that period



No data are available for Lebanon or Palestine.

Source: WFP Global Market Monitor August 2022.

(IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during periods of time when active conflict results in shortages of food or inability to move (FEWS NET, April 2022).

#### Economic shocks, including COVID-19

Rising prices of food, fuel and fertilizers further complicated the ongoing socioeconomic declines experienced by countries/territories in food crisis in this region. The war in Ukraine exerted additional upward pressure on food prices by restricting shipments of exportable supplies through Black Sea ports to countries/territories that are net food importers and therefore vulnerable to shocks in global markets (FAO, June 2022). The cost of the average food basket from April–June 2022 was well above the five-year average for that time period in several countries with available data, with the steepest increases in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen (see figure 23). Both Bangladesh and Lebanon are reliant on several commodities facing export obstacles, especially wheat, as well as the negative fiscal impact of rising import costs. This accelerated economic collapse in Lebanon, where food inflation reached 332 percent in June 2022 (FAO-WFP, August 2022).

In the Syrian Arab Republic, disruptions to the food supply chain, including for humanitarian assistance, occurred due to trade restrictions in other countries, mounting shipping costs and reduced export availabilities, which further increased food prices and diminished household purchasing power (WoS FSS, July 2022). Since 2012, the Russian Federation has been one of the Syrian Arab Republic's main sources of food imports, particularly of wheat (FAO WFP, June 2022). Domestic crop yields, especially for wheat, are below average for the second consecutive year due to the high cost of inputs and persistent dryness (GEOGLAM, August 2022).

In Yemen, protracted conflict and the deepening economic crises led to the collapse of essential services, as well as reduced incomes and limited labour opportunities (IPC, March 2022). Households continued to resort to corrosive negative coping strategies, such as selling productive assets and taking on debt. A reduction in humanitarian assistance also increased households' reliance on markets at a time when purchasing power declined due to rising costs (FEWS NET, July 2022).

Pakistan is experiencing a growing debt crisis and significant currency depreciation (WFP, June 2022; IMF, July 2022). Food inflation reached an all-time high of 26 percent, reducing households' purchasing power (WFP, June 2022).

#### Weather extremes

Successive natural disasters in June and July 2022 impacted already vulnerable households' food stocks and livelihoods in Afghanistan (FEWS NET, July 2022). On 22 June, a 5.9 magnitude earthquake struck the Paktika and Khost provinces, and on 18 July, a second 5.1 magnitude earthquake struck the same area (OCHA, August 2022). Heavy rainfall following the first earthquake resulted in mudslides, landslides, and flooding that hampered relief efforts, damaged critical infrastructure and led to the displacement of thousands, particularly in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Ghazni and Parwan provinces (GEOGLAM, August 2022). In Yemen, at least 29 people were killed and thousands more were affected – mainly IDPs – by heavy rains and flooding. Shelters, food stocks and other household items were destroyed or damaged (OCHA, July 2022).

# Latin America and the Caribbean

El Salvador | Guatemala | Haiti | Honduras | Nicaragua

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022

Few IPC analyses have been conducted in Latin America and the Caribbean since the release of the GRFC 2022, therefore the majority of analyses available do not reflect the impacts of the war in Ukraine. However, evidence from Guatemala suggests that high commodity prices and commodity shortages have adversely impacted food access and availability for vulnerable rural and urban households. The numbers of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Haiti remain high due to converging drivers.

**12.7–12.9M people** in five countries in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) or equivalent


The aggregate number includes a FEWS NET range estimate for Nicaragua. They do not provide a breakdown by phase classification so estimates for Nicaragua are not included with the disaggregated IPC data below.

**2.4M people** in four countries in IPC Phase 4

**10.4M people** in four countries in IPC Phase 3

**16.8M people** in four countries in IPC Phase 2

FIGURE 24  
Number of people in five countries in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2021–2022



Source: FSIN, using IPC and FEWS NET (for Nicaragua) data.

Among the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Guatemala is forecast to experience the most significant increase (23 percent) in the population facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2022 compared to November 2020–March 2021, which contained the highest number of people in these phases in 2021. In June–September 2022, **4.6 million people – including 552 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4)** – are projected to be in these phases, representing 26 percent of the population (IPC, June 2022).

Numbers are also expected to remain high for Haiti in 2022 compared to 2021, with nearly **4.5 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above)** during March–June, up 3 percent since the 2021 peak (March–June) (IPC, March 2022). This figure includes 1.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The IPC analyses for Honduras and El Salvador in 2022 were carried out before the breakout of the war in Ukraine and thus do not portray its rippling effects, therefore the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in these countries could be higher than reported.<sup>25</sup>

### Key drivers


#### Economic shocks, including COVID-19

Rising food and energy prices are putting additional pressures on households, particularly poor rural and urban ones that have yet to recover from the economic and weather shocks of recent years.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a profound socioeconomic impact on the region despite government social protection programmes (ECLAC, June 2022). Economic growth is slowing after its initial rebound in 2021. Labour markets have not recovered and many

<sup>25</sup> No updated estimates have been made available since the release of the GRFC 2022.

FIGURE 25  
Numbers and share of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022 (includes IPC Phase 2 numbers, where available)



Source: FSIN, using IPC and FEWS NET (for Nicaragua) data.

workers have lost their jobs, especially those held by women and in the informal sector (IDB, April 2022). Rising international commodity prices increased domestic inflationary pressures, further eroding purchasing power of vulnerable households and their food access.


In June–September 2022, the prices of food, transport and fertilizers were expected to be higher than in the same period in 2021 and, also, above the five-year average for Central America and the Caribbean. (FEWS NET, July 2022). During April–June 2022, in the four countries with data (out of the five analysed here) the cost of the basic food basket was 28–88 percent above the five-year average (WFP, August 2022) (see figure 26).

## Acute food insecurity in mid-2022 *continued*

FIGURE 26

### Percentage change in cost of a food basket

April–June 2022 average versus five-year average for that period



No data are available for Guatemala.

Source: WFP Global Market Monitor August 2022.

The increased cost of agricultural inputs and fuel were primary drivers of high output prices of white maize and red beans, the region's two staple crops. Between June 2021 and June 2022, the wholesale price of white maize rose by 75 percent in El Salvador, 45 percent in Guatemala, and 40 percent in Honduras, triggering FAO to declare moderate domestic price warnings (FAO-GIEWS, July 2022). During the same period, there was a 40 percent increase in the wholesale price of red beans in Nicaragua, the region's main beans supplier (FAO-GIEWS, July 2022). The rising wholesale staple food prices were also felt at the retail level, eroding the purchasing power and reducing food access of poor rural and urban households, which spend high shares of income on these staple crops (FEWS NET, July 2022).

Central America relies on fertilizer imports from the Russian Federation (IFPRI, August 9, 2022). Fertilizer export restrictions imposed by various countries have decreased supply, resulting in increased fertilizer prices and agricultural production costs. Governments have tried to mitigate the impact of these higher costs, but small and medium producers are nonetheless reducing their area of cultivation, which could lead to both lower yields and a decreased demand for agricultural labour (FEWS NET, July 2022).

Haiti is experiencing double-digit inflation for the seventh consecutive year (IMF, April 2022). It has increased further with respect to 2021 levels due to the spill-over effects of the war in Ukraine, as higher commodity prices are passed through to the local food basket.

This in conjunction with the depreciation of the national currency, which lost 25 percent of its value between June 2021 and June 2022, has put upward pressure on the price of imported foods (FAO-GIEWS, August 2022). As a net food-importing country, Haiti is vulnerable to shocks in global food markets (FAO, July 2022), which is playing out in the higher year-on-year prices of imported staples (rice, maize and black beans).

### Weather extremes

Growing conditions have generally been favourable across much of Central America throughout the first half of 2022. However, above-average rainfall from July–October could delay the planting of the Postrera season as well as lead to challenges of pests and diseases (FEWS NET, July 2022). The 2022 Atlantic hurricane season is expected to be active, which brings with it the increased risk of flash floods, landslides, and other storm hazards (GEOGLAM, August 2022).

Below-average rainfall and high temperatures in Haiti have negatively affected crop development during the spring main season and will likely continue to disrupt agricultural production during the second planting season (FEWS NET, July 2022).

### Conflict/insecurity

The deteriorating security situation in Port-au-Prince has disrupted Haitian supply chains and further jeopardized food affordability and access at a time when most of the country is facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) due to rising food and energy costs, and the effects of several natural disasters (WFP, July 2022). For instance, clashes between gangs in the Martissant neighbourhood has led to a year-long blockage of the main road leading to the southern peninsula, which was badly affected by the August 2021 earthquake, and it has severely



© WFP/HESHA PORR

Local markets in Haiti have experienced a significant increase in prices due to the current insecurity in the country and the ripple effect of the Ukraine war.

impacted departments' ability to access basic goods and services, as well as delayed reconstruction efforts (OCHA, July 2022). Since April 2022, clashes between gangs have erupted throughout the city, leaving hundreds dead and forcing thousands to flee their homes (OCHA, May 2022). The Cité Soleil neighbourhood has been hit hard by the fighting, with residents confined by the violence in July 2022 and unable to access food, non-food items and drinking water (UNCT Haiti, July 2022).



# APPENDIX 1

TABLE OF ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ESTIMATES, 2020–2022

TABLE 1.1 (PAGE 1 OF 4)

### Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2020–2022

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2020, 2021 and 2022 as of August 2022.<sup>†</sup> Of the 53 countries/territories that qualified as food crises in the GRFC 2022, this table includes the 45 countries/territories for which data were available in 2022 as of 10 August. For a complete list of the 53 countries/territories, please refer to the GRFC 2022.

Countries		2020 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (updated) <sup>†</sup>						
		USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Afghanistan †††	Jan–Apr	IPC	Nov 2020–Mar 2021	32.9 95%	Entire country	10.6 34%	13.2* 42%	IPC	Nov 2021–Mar 2022	41.7 100%	Entire country	12.5 30%	22.8* 55%	IPC	Nov 2021–Mar 2022	41.7 100%	Entire country	12.5 30%	22.8* 55%	
Angola	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct 2019–Feb 2020	31.8 3%	23 communes in 8 municipalities	0.2 21%	0.6* 62%	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar 2022	32.1 9%	17 rural municipalities in 3 south-western provinces	0.7 25%	1.6* 58%	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar 2022	32.1 9%	17 rural municipalities in 3 south-western provinces	0.7 25%	1.6* 58%	
Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar) †††	Jan–Dec (refugees) Varies (hosts)	REVA (ENA)	Nov–Dec 2020	164.7 3%	Rohingya refugees and host populations in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas of Cox's Bazar District	N/A	1.2 87%	JRP (ENA)	Oct–Nov 2021	164.7 1%	Rohingya refugees and host populations in Cox's Bazar	N/A	1.3 84%	No forecast						
Benin	Jun–Aug	Not selected						CH	Jun–Aug 2021	12.5 72%	Entire country except Cotonou	1.4 16%	0.3 3%	CH	Mar–May 2022	12.9 100%	Entire country	2.8 21%	1.2* 9%	
Burkina Faso	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	21.4 100%	Entire country	5.2 24%	3.3** 15%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	22.0 98%	Entire country	4.8 22%	2.9* 13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.9 97%	Entire country	5.3 25%	3.5* 16%	
Burundi	Apr–May	IPC	May 2020	11.9 92%	Entire country	3.9 36%	1.4* 13%	IPC	Apr–May 2021	12.5 94%	Entire country	5.0 43%	1.6* 14%	IPC	Apr–May 2022	12.0 100%	Entire country	3.1 25%	1.2 10%	
Cabo Verde		CH	Jun–Aug 2020	0.6 86%	17 out of 22 municipalities	0.07 14%	0.01 2%	Data gap						CH	Jun–Aug 2022	0.5 100%	Entire country	0.1 29%	0.05* 10%	
Cameroon	Mar–May	CH	Oct–Dec 2020	25.9 100%	Entire country	6.2 24%	2.7* 10%	CH	Mar–May 2021	25.9 100%	Entire country	5.8 23%	2.6* 10%	CH	Mar–May 2022	26.6 100%	Entire country	6.1 23%	2.9* 11%	
Central African Republic***	May–Aug	IPC	May–Aug 2020	4.8 95%	Excluding Bambouti, Djéma, Yalinga, Ouadda, Ouanda-jallé, Mingala, Mbrès and Berbérati	1.6 35%	2.4* 51%	IPC	Apr–Aug 2021	4.9 100%	Entire country except Bambouti, Djéma, Ouadda and Yalinga	1.6 33%	2.3* 47%	IPC	Apr–Aug 2022	5.7 87%	Entire country except Bambouti, Djéma, Ouadda and Yalinga	1.5 31%	2.2* 45%	
Chad	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	16.2 90%	Entire country, except N'Djamena	3.1 21%	1.0* 7%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	16.7 92%	Entire country, except N'Djamena	3.3 22%	1.8* 12%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	16.8 94%	Entire country, except N'Djamena	4.0 25%	2.1* 13%	
Côte d'Ivoire	Mar–May	CH	Mar–May 2020	26.5 23%	12 regions	0.9 15%	0.2 4%	CH	Oct–Dec 2021	27.7 58%	9 districts (23 regions)	2.8 18%	0.9 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	27.7 58%	9 districts (23 regions)	3.1 19%	0.7 4%	
Democratic Republic of the Congo***	Varies by area/region	IPC	Jul–Dec 2020	103.2 65%	85 territories and 18 urban areas	29.0 44%	21.8* 33%	IPC	Feb–Jul 2021	105.0 91%	133 territories and 37 urban areas	40.8 42%	27.3* 28%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2022	115.2 91%	131 territories, 24 communes of Kinshasa, 24 urban areas	47.8 45%	25.9* 25%	
Djibouti	Jun–Sep	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	1.1 100%	Entire country	0.3 26%	0.2* 14%	IPC	Jan–Aug 2021	1.1 100%	Entire country	0.4 35%	0.2* 17%	IPC	Jul–Dec 2022	1.2 100%	Entire country	0.4 35%	0.2* 16%	

† The cut-off date for inclusion in this mid-year update was 10 August, 2022. Food security analyses published after this date are not included in this report. †† The increase in Afghanistan in 2021 can also be attributed to changes in the base population used in the October 2021 IPC analysis, which, at the request of the humanitarian community in Afghanistan, used Flowminder population estimates used for the annual HRP. ††† The 2020 and 2021 estimates are based on the ENA methodology, for which the GRFC TWG has identified comparability challenges with IPC/CH estimates (see Technical Notes).

\* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). \*\* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). \*\*\* FEWS NET's analyses suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance was lower than the IPC estimate.

TABLE 1.1 (PAGE 2 OF 4)

### Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2020–2022

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2020, 2021 and 2022 as of August 2022.<sup>†</sup> Of the 53 countries/territories that qualified as food crises in the GRFC 2022, this table includes the 45 countries/territories for which data were available in 2022 as of 10 August. For a complete list of the 53 countries/territories, please refer to the GRFC 2022.

Countries		2020 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (updated) <sup>†</sup>					
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue	USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Egypt (Syrian refugees)	Jan–Dec	WFP	Jun 2020	0.3 50%	WFP-assisted refugees from Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq	N/A N/A	0.05 38%	WFP	Jun 2020	0.3 50%	WFP-assisted refugees from Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq	N/A N/A	0.05 38%	No forecast					
El Salvador	Jun–Aug	IPC	Nov 2020–Feb 2021	6.8 99%	Entire country	2.2 33%	0.7* 10%	IPC	Mar–May 2021	6.8 99%	Entire country	2.4 36%	1.0* 15%	IPC	Mar–May 2022	6.3 100%	Entire country	3.3 52%	0.9* 14%
Eswatini	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	1.1 98%	Entire country	0.4 34%	0.4* 32%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	1.2 97%	Entire country	0.4 38%	0.3* 30%	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	1.2 100%	Entire country	0.4 32%	0.3* 29%
Ethiopia***	Feb–Jun	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	115.0 46%	Belg and Meher areas	15.8 30%	8.6* 16%	IPC	May–Jun 2021	115.0 49%	Belg and Meher-dependent areas	17.2 31%	16.8** 30%	HRP	2022	102.5 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	20.4 20%
Gambia	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	2.5 100%	Entire country	0.6 23%	0.1 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	2.5 97%	Entire country	0.5 20%	0.1 5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	2.5 100%	Entire country	0.6 25%	0.2* 8%
Guatemala***	Jun–Aug	IPC	Nov 2020–Mar 2021	16.9 100%	Entire country (22 departments and Guatemala (metropolitana))	6.7 40%	3.7* 23%	IPC	Nov 2020–Mar 2021	16.9 100%	Entire country (22 departments and Guatemala (metropolitana))	6.7 40%	3.7* 23%	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	17.4 100%	Entire country	7.1 41%	4.6* 26%
Guinea	Jun–Aug	CH	Oct–Dec 2020	13.3 83%	Excluding Conakry	2.1 19%	0.6 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	13.3 83%	Excluding Conakry	2.2 20%	0.7 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	13.3 84%	Excluding Conakry	3.8 34%	1.2* 11%
Guinea-Bissau	Jun–Aug	CH	Oct–Dec 2020	2.0 62%	Excluding Bissau	0.5 36%	0.2* 12%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	2.1 64%	Excluding Bissau	0.3 22%	0.1 8%	CH	Mar–May 2022	2.1 63%	Excluding Bissau	0.3 26%	0.1 10%
Haiti***	Mar–Jun	IPC	Mar–Jun 2020	11.3 93%	Rural and urban areas (excluding Villes de Gonaïves)	2.8 27%	4.1* 40%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2021	10.9 87%	Rural and urban areas (excluding Villes de Gonaïves)	2.8 29%	4.4* 46%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2022	10.9 91%	Rural and urban areas	2.7 27%	4.5* 45%
Honduras	Jun–Aug	IPC	Dec 2020–Mar 2021	9.3 100%	Entire country	3.5 37%	2.9* 31%	IPC	Jul–Sep 2021	9.3 100%	Entire country	3.5 38%	3.3* 35%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2022	9.6 100%	Entire country	3.7 39%	2.6* 28%
Iraq	No typical lean season	HNO	Jan–Dec 2020	39.1 15%	Conflict-affected populations (IDPs and returnees)	N/A N/A	0.7 12%	HNO	Jul–Aug 2021	41.2 15%	IDPs and returnees	N/A N/A	0.6 10%	WFP	Jun 2022	42.2 3%	IDPs inside and outside camps	N/A N/A	0.1 11%
Jordan (Syrian refugees)	Jan–Dec	WFP	Oct–Dec 2020	0.7 83%	Syrian refugees in host communities	N/A N/A	0.2 25%	WFP	Sep 2021	0.7 100%	Syrian refugees in host communities and camps	N/A N/A	0.1 22%	WFP	Mar 2022	0.8 100%	Syrian refugees inside and outside camps	N/A N/A	0.5**** 65%

<sup>†</sup> The cut-off date for inclusion in this mid-year update was 10 August, 2022. Food security analyses published after this date are not included in this report. \* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). \*\* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). \*\*\* FEWS NET's analyses suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance was lower than the IPC estimate. \*\*\*\* In Jordan according to the WFP CARI methodology, the number of moderately to severely food-insecure Syrian refugees increased by 231% between September 2021 and March 2022. This rise reflects both worsening food security conditions, particularly high food prices, as well as changes in the CARI methodology. Therefore, previous CARI estimates for Syrian refugees in Jordan may not be fully comparable to the March 2022 estimate. Note: The IPC estimates for Ethiopia in May–June 2021 presented in this table reflect the merger of the October 2020 and May 2021 IPC analysis results. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis.



TABLE 1.1 (PAGE 3 OF 4)

### Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2020–2022

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2020, 2021 and 2022 as of August 2022.<sup>†</sup> Of the 53 countries/territories that qualified as food crises in the GRFC 2022, this table includes the 45 countries/territories for which data were available in 2022 as of 10 August. For a complete list of the 53 countries/territories, please refer to the GRFC 2022.

Countries		2020 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (updated) <sup>†</sup>						
		USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																				
Kenya	Mar–Apr	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	53.8 33%	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (rural) and 12 urban areas	6.3 35%	1.9* 10%	IPC	Nov 2021–Jan 2022	55.0 28%	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (rural)	5.2 35%	2.4* 16%	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	55.0 27%	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (rural)	5.1 34%	4.4* 29%	
Lebanon (Syrian refugees)	Jan–Dec	VASyR	Aug 2020	0.9 100%	Syrian refugee population	N/A N/A	0.4 49%	VASyR	2021	1.5 100%	Syrian refugee population	N/A N/A	0.7 49%	No forecast						
Lesotho	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct 2020–Mar 2021	2.0 73%	Rural population	0.5 33%	0.6* 40%	IPC	Oct 2020–Mar 2021	2.0 73%	Rural population	0.5 33%	0.6* 40%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2022	2.1 70%	Rural population	0.5 36%	0.3* 23%	
Liberia	Oct–Dec	CH	Oct–Dec 2020	5.2 88%	Entire country	1.1 24%	0.5* 10%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	5.2 91%	Entire country	1.5 32%	0.9* 20%	No forecast						
Libya	No typical lean season	HNO	Jan–Dec 2020	7.4 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	0.7 9%	HNO	Jun–Aug 2021	8.2 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	0.5 6%	No forecast						
Madagascar	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	25.7 15%	Grand Sud and Est	1.7 42%	1.1* 27%	IPC	Nov–Dec 2021	27.9 16%	Grand Sud and Est	1.8 41%	1.6* 37%	IPC	Dec 2022–Mar 2023	29.0 18%	Grand Sud and Est	2.1 40%	2.1* 39%	
Malawi	Jan–Mar	IPC	Nov–Dec 2020	19.7 90%	Entire country (rural and urban)	6.2 35%	2.5 14%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	19.7 90%	Entire country (rural and urban)	6.3 35%	2.6* 15%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	19.3 100%	Entire country (rural and urban)	6.7 35%	3.8 20%	
Mali	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	20.9 98%	Entire country	3.7 18%	1.3* 7%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	21.1 100%	Entire country	4.1 19%	1.3* 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.7 100%	Entire country	4.4 20%	1.8 8%	
Mauritania	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	4.2 100%	Entire country	0.8 19%	0.6* 15%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	4.3 100%	Entire country	0.9 21%	0.5* 11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	4.4 100%	Entire country	1.4 33%	0.9* 20%	
Mozambique	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	30.1 60%	Part of the country (rural and urban areas)	8.8 48%	2.7* 15%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	30.1 60%	Part of the country (Rural and urban areas)	8.4 46%	2.9* 16%	IPC	Nov 2021–Mar 2022	30.8 47%	Part of the country (Rural and urban areas)	6.1 42%	1.9* 13%	
Namibia	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct 2020–Mar 2021	2.5 89%	Excluding Erongo region	0.7 29%	0.4* 20%	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	2.6 100%	Entire country	0.8 33%	0.8* 30%	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	2.6 100%	Entire country	0.8 33%	0.8* 30%	
Nicaragua	Jul–Aug	FEWS NET	Sep–Oct 2020	6.2 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	0.4 6%	FEWS NET	Jul–Aug 2021	6.2 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	0.4 6%	FEWS NET	Jul–Sep 2022	6.7 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	0.1–0.25 1–4%	
Niger***	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	23.0 96%	Entire country	5.0 23%	2.0* 9%	CH	Oct–Dec 2021	24.9 100%	Entire country	5.8 23%	2.6* 10%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	24.9 100%	Entire country	7.3 29%	4.4* 18%	
Nigeria***	Jun–Aug	CH	Oct–Dec 2020	212.1 49%	15 states and Federal Capital Territory	23.9 23%	9.2* 9%	CH	Oct–Dec 2021	219.5 73%	21 states and Federal Capital Territory	35.0 22%	12.9* 8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	219.5 72%	21 states and Federal Capital Territory	40.8 26%	19.5* 12%	
Pakistan	Jun–Aug	IPC	Jun–Aug 2020	220.9 2%	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1.5 29%	1.2* 25%	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar/Apr 2022	215.3 9%	Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh	6.4 35%	4.7* 25%	IPC	Apr/May–Jun 2022	215.3 9%	Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh	6.5 35%	4.7* 26%	

<sup>†</sup> The cut-off date for inclusion in this mid-year update was 10 August, 2022. Food security analyses published after this date are not included in this report. \* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). \*\* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). \*\*\* FEWS NET's analyses suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance was lower than the IPC estimate.

TABLE 1.1 (PAGE 4 OF 4)

## Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2020–2022

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2020, 2021 and 2022 as of August 2022.<sup>†</sup> Of the 53 countries/territories that qualified as food crises in the GRFC 2022, this table includes the 45 countries/territories for which data were available in 2022 as of 10 August. For a complete list of the 53 countries/territories, please refer to the GRFC 2022.

Countries	2020 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people					2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (updated) <sup>†</sup>						
	USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																			
Palestine ††	No typical lean season	HNO (SEFSec)	Jan–Dec 2020	5.2 100%	Entire territory	0.9 18%	2.0 38%	SEFSec	Dec 2020–Jan 2021	5.1 100%	Entire territory	N/A	1.8 31%	No forecast					
Rwanda (refugees)	Jan–Dec	Insufficient evidence						WFP	Jan–Dec 2021	0.1 100%	Refugee population	N/A N/A	0.04 32%	No forecast					
Senegal	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	16.7 100%	Entire country	3.5 21%	0.8* 5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	17.1 100%	Entire country	3.1 18%	0.5* 3%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	17.3 100%	Entire country	3.9 22%	0.9* 5%
Sierra Leone	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2020	8.3 100%	Entire country	4.0 49%	1.3* 16%	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	8.5 96%	Entire country	2.8 35%	1.8* 22%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	8.6 100%	Entire country	3.6 42%	1.6* 19%
Somalia	Feb–Apr	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	12.3 100%	Entire country (rural and urban areas and IDP settlements)	3.0 24%	2.1* 17%	IPC	Oct–Dec 2021	15.7 100%	Entire country (rural and urban areas and IDP settlements)	3.7 24%	3.5* 22%	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	15.7 100%	Entire country (rural and urban areas and IDP settlements)	4.1 26%	7.1** 45%
South Sudan	May–Jul	IPC	May–Jul 2020	11.7 100%	Entire country	3.3 28%	6.5* 55%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2021	12.1 100%	Entire country	3.1 26%	7.2** 60%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2022	12.4 100%	Entire country	2.9 23%	7.7** 63%
Sudan***	Aug–Sep	IPC	Jun–Sep 2020	45.3 100%	Entire country	15.9 35%	9.6* 21%	IPC	Jun–Sep 2021	46.8 100%	Entire country excluding Abyei and Al Tina	16.5 35%	9.8* 21%	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	47.9 100%	Entire country	17.6 37%	11.7* 24%
Syrian Arab Republic	No typical lean season	HNO	Oct–Dec 2020	20.8 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	12.4 60%	HNO	Oct–Nov 2021	21.7 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	12.0 55%	No forecast					
Uganda	May–Jul	IPC	Jun–Aug 2020	45.7 25%	Karamoja, urban areas, refugee settlements and host community districts	4.3 38%	2.6* 23%	FEWS NET	May–Jul 2021	45.7 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	2.2 5%	FEWS NET	Jul–Aug 2022	45.7 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	2.0–2.5 4–6%
Ukraine	Dec–Mar	HNO	Jan–Dec 2020	41.7 16%	Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and IDP population	N/A N/A	0.6 9%	HNO	Oct–Nov 2021	41.3 15%	Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and IDP population	N/A N/A	0.4 6%	FEWS NET	Apr 2022	43.8 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	2.5–4.99* 5–10%
United Republic of Tanzania	Mar–Apr	IPC	Nov 2019–Apr 2020	58.0 8%	16 districts	1.7 34%	1.0* 20%	IPC	Nov 2021–Apr 2022	57.6 6%	14 councils	0.8 23%	0.4* 13%	IPC	May–Sep 2022	57.6 6%	14 councils	0.9 26%	0.6* 17%
Yemen***	Jul–Sep	IPC	Oct–Dec 2020	30.0 100%	Entire country	10.0 33%	13.5** 45%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2021	30.0 100%	Entire country	8.6 29%	16.1** 54%	IPC	Jun–Dec 2022	31.9 100%	Entire country	7.2 23%	19.0** 60%
Zambia	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct 2019–Mar 2020	17.9 53%	86 districts (rural)	3.1 33%	2.3* 24%	IPC	Feb–Mar 2021	18.0 38%	64 districts (rural)	2.5 36%	1.7* 25%	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar 2022	18.4 66%	61 districts (rural)	5.2 43%	1.6 13%
Zimbabwe****	Jan–Mar	IPC	Feb–Jun 2020	14.6 66%	Rural population	2.8 29%	4.3* 45%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	15.6 62%	Rural population	3.1 32%	3.4* 35%	FEWS NET	Jan–Mar 2022	15.3 100%	Entire country	N/A N/A	2.5–3.0 16–20%

<sup>†</sup> The cut-off date for inclusion in this mid-year update was 10 August, 2022. Food security analyses published after this date are not included in this report. †† The 2020 and 2021 estimates are based on the SEFSec methodology, for which the GRFC TWG has identified comparability challenges with IPC/CH estimates (see Technical Notes). Please note that 31% refers to the percentage of food-insecure households as opposed to individuals, as per the unit of analysis in the SEFSec analysis (SEFSec, December 2020). \* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). \*\* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). \*\*\* FEWS NET's analyses suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance was lower than the IPC estimate. \*\*\*\* FEWS NET's 2021 analyses suggest that the population requiring emergency food assistance was higher than the IPC estimate. In late August 2022, FEWS NET's estimate for Zimbabwe was revised upwards to 3.0–3.5 million for the September–December period. This revision was not incorporated into this report's Mid-Year aggregate figure as it was issued after the cut-off date for data inclusion.



# TECHNICAL NOTES

---

## Explanations of key terminology

### Methodology

This Mid-Year Update of the GRFC 2022 upholds the same rigorous, consensus-based methodology as previous editions of the GRFC (for more information on the GRFC methodology, as well as key terminology associated with the report, please refer to the GRFC 2022). It prioritises the reporting of analyses that correspond to the time period with the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent – otherwise known as the 'peak period'.

As of the cut-off date for data inclusion (early August 2022), acute food insecurity estimates were available for 45 countries/territories in 2022. There were no data available for eight countries.

### Food insecurity

Food insecurity refers to the lack of secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal human growth and development and an active and healthy life. For people to be food secure, food must be both consistently available and accessible in sufficient quantities and diversity and households must be able to utilize (store, cook, prepare and share) the food in a way that has a positive nutritional impact.

### Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time that is of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition (IPC, 2019). Transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover.

### Food crisis

A food crisis occurs when rates of acute food insecurity and malnutrition rise sharply at local or national levels, raising the need for emergency food assistance.

This definition distinguishes a food crisis from chronic food insecurity, although food crises are far more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition. A food crisis is usually set off by a shock or combination of shocks that affect one or more of the pillars of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization or food stability.

### Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food insecurity refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. The definition includes seasonal food insecurity that occurs during periods with non-exceptional conditions.

Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption for an active and healthy life (FAO et al., 2021). FAO defines this as 'undernourishment' and it is the basis for the SDG indicator 2.1.1 published in the SOFI report.

According to the SOFI report, between 720 and 811 million people in the world faced hunger in 2020 – as many as 161 million more than in 2019. The number of people affected by severe food insecurity which is another measure that approximates hunger, shows a similar upward trend. Close to 12 percent of the global population was severely food insecure in 2020, representing 928 million people – 148 million more than in 2019. Nearly 2.37 billion people did not have access to adequate food in 2020 – an increase of 320 million people in just one year (FAO et al, July 2021).

### Differing estimates of acutely food-insecure populations

Some organizations produce different estimates based on their own geographical coverage, methods and mandate, which they use for their own operational needs.

In 2022, WFP produced acute food insecurity numbers that covered additional countries and areas relevant to WFP operations as well as used different methodologies. As a result, WFP numbers are higher.

In June 2022, WFP estimated that up to 345 million people were acutely food insecure, or at risk, across 82 countries where it operates (WFP Global Operational Response Plan, June 2022).

## Explanations of key terminology *continued*

### Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and cancer. See <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition>.

Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition (wasting, thinness, and/or bilateral pitting oedema), stunting, underweight (a composite of stunting and wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. deficiencies in vitamin A, iron) are all forms of undernutrition.

While overweight, obesity and NCDs are not a focus of this report, they often coexist with undernutrition within the same country, community, and even individual. Stunted children, for example, face a greater risk of becoming overweight as adults (UNICEF).

Malnutrition has immediate and long-reaching consequences, including stunting children's growth, increasing susceptibility to disease and infections, and contributing to 45 percent of deaths among children under 5 (WHO). The determinants of malnutrition also include inadequate access to healthcare, poor water and sanitation services, and inappropriate child feeding and care practices, as described in the UNICEF framework.

### Wasting

A child who is too thin for his or her height as a result of rapid weight loss or the failure to gain weight is a sign of wasting which, although treatable, can lead to illness, disability or death. Moderate wasting is identified by weight-for-height z scores (WHZ) between -2 and -3 of the reference population, and severe wasting by WHZ below -3. Global acute malnutrition reflects both moderate and severe wasting in a population. Wasting can also be defined by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements  $\leq$  12.5 cm, with severe wasting defined with a measurement of  $\leq$  11.5 cm. Wasting is used in this report to describe all forms of acute malnutrition including those diagnosed with oedema. Affected children require urgent feeding, treatment and care to survive. Wasting prevalence depicts the nutrition situation in the general population at a specific time: it can

show marked seasonal patterns and can change quickly over time. The immediate cause of wasting is a severe nutritional restriction as a result of inadequate food intake or recent illness, such as diarrhoea, that hinders appropriate intake and absorption of nutrients.

### Stunting

Stunting is associated with physical and cognitive damage which can affect learning and school performance, and lead to lost potential and lower earnings later in life. It can also affect the next generation. Efforts to prevent stunting are most effective in the 1 000 days between conception and a child's second birthday. Stunted children under 5 years are identified by a height-for-age z score (HAZ) below -2 of the reference population. Severe stunting is defined as HAZ below -3.

### Classifying Famine

Famine is classified in the IPC according to an internationally accepted standard based on the following three criteria:

- At least 1 in 5 households face an extreme lack of food.
- At least 30% of children suffer from wasting.
- Two people for every 10 000 dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

Given the severity and implications of this classification, all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols must be met before an area is classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5). See IPC version 3.1.

Areas can be classified as Famine Likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will likely occur. This classification can trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

The IPC supports famine prevention by highlighting the following:

- IPC Phase 4 Emergency is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.
- Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5). This is the case when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing famine conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not (or not yet) reached famine thresholds. These households experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified as Famine. This can occur due to the time lag between food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality, or in the case of a localized situation.
- Projections of Famine can be made even if the current situation is not yet classified as Famine, thus allowing early warning.

Risk of Famine is an IPC statement that highlights the potential deterioration of the situation compared to the most-likely scenario expected during the projection period. Although it is not an IPC classification, it indicates a worst-case scenario that has a reasonable probability of occurring.

## Explanations of key terminology *continued*

### Drivers of food crises

The drivers of food crises are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to pinpoint the specific trigger or driver of each food crisis. The GRFC 2022 takes a practical approach by estimating which are the most salient for each country/territory out of the broad categories explained below.

#### Conflict/insecurity

This includes interstate and intra-state conflicts, internal violence, banditry and criminality, civil unrest or political crises often leading to population displacements and/or disruption of livelihoods and food systems.

It is a key driver of acute food insecurity because in conflict situations civilians are frequently deprived of their income sources. Food systems and markets are disrupted, pushing up food prices and sometimes leading to scarcities of water and fuel, or of food itself.

Landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices often destroy agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc.

Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities, increasing poverty levels and diverting government spending towards the war effort.

Health systems are usually damaged or destroyed, leaving people reliant on humanitarian support – yet increasingly, insecurity and roadblocks prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching the most vulnerable, or aid agencies face lengthy delays, restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or insufficient security guarantees. Parties to conflict can deny people access to food as a weapon of war, especially in areas under blockade/embargo. Food insecurity itself can become a trigger for violence and instability, particularly in contexts marked by pervasive inequalities and fragile institutions. Sudden spikes in food prices tend to exacerbate the risk of political unrest and conflict (FAO et al., 2017).

For countries with conflict/insecurity being the primary driver during the past year, change to another primary driver needs serious consideration as recovery from conflict/insecurity takes a long time and may still remain as the underlying cause of food insecurity. In cases where conflict/insecurity has reduced and/or localized, with other drivers gaining more magnitude, the change in the primary driver from the previous year is possible.

For countries where the analysis is purely focused on the displaced populations, the primary driver should reflect the reason why those populations are displaced from their country of origin.

#### Weather extremes

These include droughts, floods, dry spells, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons and the untimely start of rainy seasons.

Weather extremes drive food insecurity by directly affecting crops and/or livestock, cutting off roads and preventing markets from being stocked. Poor harvests push up food prices and diminish agricultural employment opportunities and pastoralists' terms-of-trade, lowering purchasing power and access to food, and triggering an early lean season when households are more market-reliant because of reduced food stocks.

Adverse weather events are particularly grave for smallholder farmers and pastoralists who rely on agriculture and livestock-rearing to access food and often lack the resilience capacities to withstand and recover from the impacts of such shocks. People's vulnerability to weather shock events rests on their capacity to adapt and bounce back after their livelihood has been affected, as well as the scale and frequency of shocks. Repeated events further erode capacity to withstand future shocks.

Weather events and changes in climate can lead to an intensification of conflict, for instance, between pastoralist herders and farmers over access to water and grazing. There is ample evidence suggesting that natural disasters – particularly droughts – contribute to aggravating existing civil conflicts.

### Economic shocks, including the effects of COVID-19

Economic shocks can affect the food insecurity of households or individuals through various channels. Macroeconomic shocks, characterized by, for instance, a contraction in GDP leading to high unemployment rates and loss of income for those affected households, or a significant contraction in exports and/or a critical decrease in investments and other capital inflows, bringing a significant currency depreciation and high inflation, increasing production costs and food prices and worsening terms of trade, which may lead to increases in acute food insecurity.

Increases in world market prices of staple grains, oil or agricultural inputs can affect food availability, push up domestic food prices for consumers and reduce their purchasing power. Economic shocks can also result at a more localized level, or hit only a particular socioeconomic category of households. For instance, pastoralists' facing lack of animal feed, veterinary services, subsequent deteriorating livestock body conditions and depressed livestock prices are likely to be affected by a reduction in purchasing power, and face a constrained access to food as a result.

Countries with weak governance and institutions, or facing armed conflict, civil unrest or instability, are particularly vulnerable to the impact of economic decline. High debt and limited fiscal space constrain economic growth, increase vulnerability to economic shocks and detract from development spending.

COVID-19 had an impact on the global economy and consequences at national level in terms of acute food insecurity in countries affected by crises. The pandemic has triggered the deepest global recession since the second world war. COVID-19 and the related containment measures affected worldwide trade, and brought a collapse in oil demand and low global oil prices, detrimental for revenues of countries depending on it (WB, June 2020).

The socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic, particularly in terms of income losses at the household level, are exacerbating and intensifying already fragile food security conditions. Across all food crisis countries, the pandemic is considered as a key factor that has worsened acute food insecurity and increased the need for

## Explanations of key terminology *continued*

humanitarian assistance (FAO, December 2020). Furthermore, the uneven global economic recovery from the effects of the pandemic during 2021 has been a factor behind a surge in world market prices for food, which – despite a gradual recovery of jobs and incomes – has become a source of further acute food insecurity in several food crisis contexts.

### Disease outbreaks

Disease outbreaks (occurrence of disease cases in excess of normal expectancy) are usually caused by an infection, transmitted through person-to-person contact, animal-to-person contact, or from the environment or other media. Water, sanitation, food and air quality are vital elements in the transmission of communicable diseases and in the spread of diseases prone to cause epidemics.

Displaced populations – particularly in overcrowded camps – are more susceptible to disease outbreaks which strained health systems cannot prevent or control (WHO). Epidemics and pandemics can also affect the ability of people to carry on their activities and livelihoods and, in the worst cases when widespread, may also affect markets and supply chains.

### Crop pests and animal diseases

Transboundary plant pests and diseases can easily spread to several countries and reach epidemic proportions. Outbreaks and upsurges can cause huge losses to crops and pastures, threatening the livelihoods of vulnerable farmers and the food and nutrition security of millions at a time. Crop pests such as fall armyworms and desert locusts can damage crops and may lead to severe production shortfalls.

Desert locusts are the most destructive locust species. Locust swarms can be dense and highly mobile and can fly as much as 150 km a day, given favourable winds. They migrate across continents and are a potential threat to the livelihoods of one-tenth of the world's population. This pest is a serious menace to agricultural production in Africa, the Near East and Southwest Asia.

A locust can eat its own weight (about 2 grams) in plants every day. That means one million locusts can eat about one tonne of food each

day, and the largest swarms can consume over 100 000 tonnes each day, or enough to feed tens of thousands of people for one year (FAO).

All animal diseases have the potential to adversely affect human populations by reducing the quantity and quality of food, other livestock products (hides, skins, fibres) and animal power (traction, transport) that can be obtained from a given quantity of resources and by reducing people's assets. Of these, transboundary animal diseases tend to have the most serious consequences.

Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs) may be defined as those epidemic diseases which are highly contagious or transmissible and have the potential for very rapid spread, irrespective of national borders, causing serious socioeconomic and possibly public health consequences.

These diseases, which cause a high morbidity and mortality in susceptible animal populations, constitute a constant threat to the livelihood of livestock farmers. Peste des petits ruminants (PPR), foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) or Rift Valley fever (RVF) often affect livestock and pastoralists' livelihoods in food-crisis contexts.

### Forced displacement

Forced displacement is the movement of people who have been obliged to leave their homes, particularly to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. Displacement is often a side-effect of conflict, food insecurity and weather shocks.

Displaced people are often more vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition, having had to abandon their livelihoods and assets, undertake arduous journeys and settle in areas or camps with limited access to basic services or former social networks. Their rights are often restricted due to host country legal frameworks, resulting in a lack of access to land, employment and freedom of movement. They are often dependent on humanitarian assistance to meet their food needs.

Displaced populations often face severely compromised access to safe water and improved sanitation and are at increased risk of

frequent outbreaks of infectious disease, which weakened health systems cannot treat, prevent or control. In crises, children are often not able to access other preventive services such as micronutrient supplementation and immunization, further increasing the risk of malnutrition. Displacement can also result in the break-down of familial and community networks that provide the necessary support and guidance needed for looking after young children.

### Refugees

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. Refugees are recognized under various international agreements. Some are recognized as a group or on a 'prima facie' basis while others undergo an individual investigation before being given refugee status. The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees provide the full legal definition of a refugee.

### Asylum-seekers

An asylum-seeker is a person seeking sanctuary in a country other than their own and waiting for a decision about their status. The legal processes related to asylum are complex and variable, which is a challenge when it comes to counting, measuring and understanding the asylum-seeking population. When an asylum application is successful, the person is awarded refugee status.

### Internally displaced people (IDPs)

IDPs are those forced to flee their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border.

### Stateless people

A stateless person is someone who does not have a nationality of any country. Some people are born stateless, but others become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that 'Everyone has the right to a nationality' (UNGA, 1948, article 15).

## IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity reference table

Phase name and description	Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine		
	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)		
Priority response objectives	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	<b>Urgent action required to</b> →				
			Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps	Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods		
Food security first-level outcomes	First-level outcomes refer to characteristics of food consumption and livelihood change. Thresholds that correspond as closely as possible to the Phase descriptions are included for each indicator. Although cut-offs are based on applied research and presented as global reference, correlation between indicators is often somewhat limited and findings need to be contextualized. The area is classified in the most severe Phase that affects at least 20% of the population.						
	Food consumption (focus on energy intake)	<b>Quantity: Adequate energy intake</b> Dietary energy intake: Adequate (avg. 2 350 kcal pp/day) and stable Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5–12 food groups and stable Food Consumption Score: Acceptable and stable Household Hunger Scale: 0 (none) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 0–3 Household Economy Analysis: No livelihood protection deficit Food Insecurity Experience Scale: (FIES 30 days recall): <0.58	<b>Quantity: Minimally Adequate</b> Dietary energy intake: Minimally adequate (avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5-FG but deterioration ≥1 FG from typical Food Consumption Score: Acceptable but deterioration from typical Household Hunger Scale: 1 (slight) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 4–18 Household Economy Analysis: Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80% FIES: Between -0.58 and 0.36	<b>Quantity: Moderately Inadequate</b> – Moderate deficits Dietary energy intake: Food gap (below avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 3–4 FG Food Consumption Score: Borderline Household Hunger Scale: 2–3 (moderate) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (non-defining characteristics (NDC) to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; or survival deficit <20% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	<b>Quantity: Very Inadequate</b> – Large deficits Dietary energy intake: Large food gap; well below 2 100 kcal pp/day Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 4 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥20% but <50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	<b>Quantity: Extremely Inadequate</b> – Very large deficits Dietary energy intake: Extreme food gap Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 5–6 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	
	Livelihood change (assets and strategies)	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> No stress, crisis or emergency coping observed	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Stressed strategies and/or assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Stress strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and/or assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Crisis strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Emergency strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	<b>Livelihood change:</b> Near complete collapse of strategies and assets <b>Livelihood coping strategies:</b> Near exhaustion of coping capacity	
Food security second-level outcomes	Second-level outcomes refer to area-level estimations of nutritional status and mortality that are especially useful for identification of more severe phases when food gaps are expected to impact malnutrition and mortality. For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits should be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of the classification.						
	Nutritional status*	Global Acute Malnutrition based on Weight-for-Height Z-score	Acceptable <5%	Alert 5–9.9%	Serious 10–14.9% or > than usual	Critical 15–29.9% or > much greater than average	Extremely Critical ≥30%
		Global Acute Malnutrition based on Mid-Upper Arm Circumference	<5%	5–9.9%	10–14.9%	≥15%	
		Body Mass Index <18.5	<5%	5–9.9%	10–19.9%, 1.5 x greater than baseline	20–39.9%	≥40%
Mortality*	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate 0.5–0.99/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate 1–2/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate 1–1.99/10,000/day or <2x reference Under-five Death Rate 2–3.99/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate ≥2/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate ≥4/10,000/day		
Food security contributing factors	For contributing factors, specific indicators and thresholds for different phases need to be determined and analysed according to the livelihood context; nevertheless, general descriptions for contributing factors are provided below.						
	Food availability, access, utilization, and stability	Adequate to meet short-term food consumption requirements Safe water ≥15 litres pp/day	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water marginally ≥15 litres pp/day	Inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >7.5 to 15 litres pp/day	Very inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >3 to <7.5 litres pp/day	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water ≤3 litres pp/day	
Hazards and vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or extreme food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits		

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity reference table was updated on October 1st, 2021 to reflect the inclusion of the FIES among the food security first-level outcomes. For more information on the FIES, see Boero, V., Cafiero, C., Gheri, F., Kepple, A.W., Rosero Moncayo J. & Viviani, S. 2021. Access to food in 2020. Results of twenty national surveys using the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES). FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb5623en>



## Acute food insecurity classifications

The GRFC process and reports prioritize the use of IPC and CH as data sources on Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity. When recent IPC/CH data is not available, alternative sources have been considered such as FEWS NET or the WFP CARI scale.

### Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of acute food insecurity. There are around 30 countries currently implementing the IPC.

It provides the 'big picture' evidence base of food crises by assessing the following: how severe, how many, when, where, why, who, as well as the key characteristics. It provides data for two time periods – the current situation and future projection. This information helps governments, humanitarian actors and other decision-makers quickly understand a crisis (or potential crisis) and take action.

The IPC makes the best use of the evidence available through a transparent, traceable and rigorous process. Evidence requirements to complete classification have been developed, taking into consideration the range of circumstances in which evidence quality and quantity may be limited while ensuring adherence to minimum standards. To ensure the application of the IPC in settings where access for collecting evidence is limited or non-existent, specialized parameters have been developed. The IPC provides a structured process for making the best assessment of the situation based on what is known and shows the limitations of its classifications as part of the process.

IPC analysis teams consolidate and analyse complex evidence from different methods and sources (e.g., food prices, seasonal calendars, rainfall, food-security assessments, etc.), but the IPC allows them to describe their conclusions using the same, consistent language and standards and in a simple and accessible form. This harmonized approach is particularly useful in comparing situations across countries and regions, and over time.

The IPC technical manual version 3.1 provides information to appreciate and critically utilize IPC products as well as the protocols, including tools and procedures, to conduct the classification itself. See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/ipc-manual/en/>

### Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by CILSS for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon. It aims to inform national and regional food crisis prevention and management systems. It takes into account various indicators of food and nutrition security outcomes and contributing factors.

The CH relies on existing food security and nutrition information systems that have been in place in most Sahelian countries since 1985, and more recently in other coastal countries of West Africa. There are 18 countries currently implementing the CH: Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The CH version 2.0 clarifies the specific functions and protocols for carrying out an integrated and consensual analysis of acute food and nutrition insecurity. See: <http://www.cilss.int/index.php/2019/10/04/cadre-harmonise-manuel-version-2-0/>

### IPC/CH five-phase classification

As a result of technical developments of the CH tools and processes and harmonization efforts carried out over the last decade, the IPC and the CH acute food insecurity approaches are very close to each other and give comparable figures of acute food insecurity. The five-phase classification is the same though there are a few differences pertaining to the use of certain indicators, classification of famine and estimation of humanitarian assistance.

Classification into five phases (1) None/Minimal, (2) Stressed,

(3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, (5) Catastrophe/Famine is based on a convergence of available evidence, including indicators related to food consumption, livelihoods, malnutrition and mortality. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene, and therefore influences priority response objectives. Populations in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance. Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) require a different set of actions — ideally disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection interventions. Classifying Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5), the fifth phase of food insecurity, requires analytical conclusions that meet three specific criteria. See page 234.

### FEWS NET

Funded and managed by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) provides early warning and evidence-based analysis of acute food insecurity to inform humanitarian and development response. FEWS NET is monitoring 29 countries where it analyses the dynamics of food, nutrition and livelihood security so policymakers can design programmes that address the root causes of persistent or recurrent acute food insecurity, malnutrition and vulnerability.

FEWS NET and IPC use the same scale although FEWS NET figures may differ as it uses a different approach. FEWS NET classification is IPC compatible, which means it follows key IPC protocols but is not built on multi-partner technical consensus, so it does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners. See <https://fews.net/fews-data/333>

### WFP

Prior to any intervention, WFP undertakes an analysis of the food security situation with partners to perform effective targeting, determine the most appropriate type and scale of intervention and ensure the most efficient use of humanitarian resources.

The Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security

## Acute food insecurity classifications *continued*

(CARI) is a WFP method used to analyse and report the level of food insecurity within a population. It addresses the multiple dimensions of food security. It uses up to five indicators – Food Consumption Score, food energy shortfall, poverty status, food expenditure share and livelihood coping strategies – that are consistent with internationally accepted food security concepts to assess a household’s current food security status and its coping capacity. Each surveyed household is classified into one of four food security categories – food secure, marginally food secure, moderately food insecure and severely food insecure. The results are presented within the CARI food security console, which provides the prevalence of each available CARI food security indicator. The aggregate results provide the population’s overall food security outcome or Food Security Index (FSI).

The five indicators included within the CARI approach can be used within IPC/CH analysis, but there are many differences between the two methods. The fundamental difference is that the CARI analyses primary data from a single household survey, while the IPC/CH uses a ‘convergence-of-evidence’ approach, incorporating and analysing a variety of secondary information. While the CARI assesses the situation at a fixed point in time with no forecasting, the IPC/CH provides the current snapshot and a projection based on the most likely scenario for any time period in the future.

CARI is an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. As a general rule based on consensus between partners in the framework of the GRFC, populations that are classified as ‘moderately food insecure’ and ‘severely food insecure’ as per WFP CARI methodology are reported as broadly equivalent to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

### Disclaimer on WFP rCARI methodology

The WFP remote-CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation

biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9–10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

### Example of a completed CARI console

DOMAIN		INDICATOR	FOOD SECURE (1)	MARGINALLY FOOD SECURE (2)	MODERATELY FOOD INSECURE (3)	SEVERELY FOOD INSECURE (4)
CURRENT STATUS	Food consumption	Food consumption group	Acceptable 51%		Borderline 36%	Poor 13%
COPING CAPACITY	Economic vulnerability	Food expenditure share	Share <50% 8%	50%-65% 9%	65%-75% 11%	Share >75% 72%
	Asset depletion	Livelihood coping strategy categories	66%	Stress 19%	Crisis 3%	Emergency 11%
FOOD SECURITY INDEX			6.9%	43.7%	42.7%	6.8%

An **Essential Needs Assessment (ENA)** uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis to understand whether and how people facing a crisis or shock, including in refugee settings, are meeting their essential needs. The assessment estimates the number of people unable to meet their essential needs and profiles these households by describing their main characteristics. Indicators include measures of households’ economic capacity to meet essential needs, multidimensional deprivation of essential needs, coping strategies employed, and how households prioritize needs. In the GRFC, ENA-driven food insecurity statistics are considered as ‘insufficient evidence’ due to lack of comparability with IPC/CH Phases.

In the GRFC 2022, an exception was made to include the ENA estimate produced for Cox’s Bazar, despite concerns of the GRFC Technical Working Group (TWG) regarding comparability. This exception was made due to the fact that several previous editions of the GRFC included ENA-based estimates from the JRP, therefore facilitating comparability of acute food insecurity levels across years. Additionally, in the absence of the ENA estimate, there would have been a data gap for this major crisis.

In preparation for the next GRFC process, the GRFC TWG will assess in more detail the comparability of ENA estimates to conventional estimates included in the GRFC. *For more information see <https://www.wfp.org/publications/essential-needs-guidelines-july-2018>*

### Humanitarian Needs Overview and other estimates

HNO provides the People in Need (PiN) figure for the Food Security and Livelihoods cluster, based on data collected during the year. When no other sources for acute food insecurity estimates are available, the GRFC Food Security TWG assesses the methodology of the PiN to ensure it is based on acute food insecurity indicators and equivalent to Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) for use in the GRFC.

In previous editions of the GRFC, the HNO utilised acute food insecurity estimates for Palestine based on the results of the PCBS and Food Security Sector Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec). Although the GRFC TWG validated the use of this estimate for previous editions, as well as the GRFC 2022, it noted certain methodological limitations that may limit the comparability of SEFSec estimates relative to conventional GRFC sources. In particular, the SEFSec methodology does not utilise standard food consumption thresholds, but rather country-specific thresholds, which may complicate comparability with other methodologies. Additionally, the SEFSec methodology combines resilience, poverty and food security indicators together in one index, which mixes proxy indicators for chronic and acute food insecurity measurements. In contrast, the GRFC aims to focus solely on acute food insecurity as opposed to elements of chronic food insecurity, which are covered extensively in the annual SOFI reports.

## Historical inclusion of countries/territories in the GRFC, 2017–2022

Over the six years of the GRFC's existence, 39 countries/territories have systematically appeared as food crises each year following the rigorous selection process. Of these, 19 have qualified as a major food crisis each year. *See tables.*

Fifteen countries have regularly been selected for inclusion but subsequently excluded because of recurrent data gaps. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have had estimates available only once during the five-year period and qualified as major food crises. The other countries regularly excluded are: the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cuba, the Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu.

Over the six years, several regional crises have featured, allowing for coverage of countries that would otherwise not have qualified for inclusion as a major food crises. The Lake Chad Basin region (Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and northeastern Nigeria) was included in 2017, 2018 and 2019 editions. The Central Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger) was in the GRFC 2020. The Central American Dry Corridor region (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) was in the 2018–2020 editions. As many of these food crises have grown in severity and magnitude, the countries have qualified for inclusion in their own right.

Since the GRFC 2019, populations of Syrian refugees, notably in Lebanon, and Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and Ecuador qualified for inclusion in the GRFC, although data were not always available. However, these populations were analysed within the broader context of their country of origin and were not reported individually.

### Frequency of inclusion of food crises in the GRFC, 2017–2022

<b>6 years</b>	<b>39 countries</b> Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
<b>5 years</b>	<b>9 countries</b> Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, El Salvador, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine*, United Republic of Tanzania, Ukraine
<b>4 years</b>	<b>3 countries</b> Cabo Verde, Lebanon (refugees), Myanmar
<b>3 years</b>	<b>2 countries</b> Jordan (refugees), Turkey (refugees)
<b>2 years</b>	<b>6 countries</b> Colombia (migrants), Ecuador (migrants), Egypt (refugees), Nepal, Rwanda (refugees), South Africa
<b>Once</b>	<b>6 countries</b> Congo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Peru (migrants), Sri Lanka, Togo, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The occupied Palestinian territories are referred to as Palestine in the GRFC 2022.

### Frequency of inclusion of major food crises in the GRFC, 2017–2022

<b>6 years</b>	<b>19 countries</b> Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Zimbabwe
<b>5 years</b>	<b>8 countries</b> Bangladesh, Burundi, Guatemala, Lesotho, Kenya, Pakistan, Palestine, Uganda
<b>4 years</b>	<b>4 countries</b> Burkina Faso, Honduras, Iraq, Zambia
<b>3 years</b>	<b>4 countries</b> Angola, El Salvador, Mali, Namibia
<b>2 years</b>	<b>5 countries</b> Djibouti, Sierra Leone, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Ukraine
<b>Once</b>	<b>2 countries</b> Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
<b>Never</b>	<b>16 countries</b> Cabo Verde, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Togo

### Number of food crises and major food crises, GRFC 2017–2022

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Number of food crises	48	51	53	55	55	53
Number of major food crises	23	29	32	35	34	35

## Comparability issues of acute food insecurity estimates in major food crises, 2021–2022

This section aims to highlight where the population coverage increased/decreased by more than one million people between 2021 and 2022 (i.e. updating the information provided in the GRFC 2022 for Benin, CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe).

### Benin

The 2021 and 2022 peak estimates are not comparable. While the 2021 peak estimate (based on March 2021 CH analysis) covered 72 percent of the population or 9 million people, the 2022 peak estimates – based on the March 2022 CH analysis – covering 100 percent of the country population or 12.9 million people.

### Central African Republic

Comparison between the 2021 and 2022 peak estimates is limited. While the population analysed in absolute terms is comparable (i.e. 4.9 million people in both cases), the country population data used by the IPC analysis increased from 4.9 million in February 2021 to 5.7 million in March 2022. Therefore, the percentage of population covered by the analysis decreased from 100 percent in 2021 to 87 percent in 2022.

### Democratic Republic of the Congo

Comparison between the 2021 and 2022 peak estimates is limited. The peak estimates of 2021 and 2022 have the same percentage in total population coverage – 91 percent – despite an increasing geographical coverage, from 133 territories in February 2021 to 179 in September 2021, which includes the 2022 projection for January–June. The country population data used by the IPC analysis also increased from 105 million in February 2021 to 115.2 million in September 2021.

### Ethiopia

Comparability of the 2021 and 2022 peak estimates is limited due to difference in coverage and methodology used. The 2021 peak is based on IPC analysis covering the Belg and Meher-dependent areas – i.e. 56 million people analysed representing 49 percent of the total country population. However, the peak estimate for 2022 estimates is based on OCHA's estimates for the Humanitarian Response Plan 2022, which analysed the entire country – or 102.5 million people. The HRP includes estimates from some indicators that are not considered in alignment with the IPC.

### Iraq

The 2021 and 2022 peak estimates are not comparable. While the 2021 peak estimates covered only the IDP and returnee population through OCHA's estimates for the Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, based on the WFP CARI methodology (population coverage reached 15 percent of the total country population, or 6.0 million people), the 2022 peak estimates provided by WFP covered only 3 percent of the IDP population inside and outside camps, or around 1.2 million people, while the entire country was inhabited by an estimated 42.2 million people.

### Jordan

Comparison between the 2021 and 2022 peak estimates is limited. While both estimates are provided by WFP using CARI methodology, the September 2021 analysis covered 672,804 people using traditional CARI, while the March 2022 analysis covered 754,355 people using the ECMEN to replace the standard poverty indicator in the coping capacity analysis. This leads to different sensitivity to acute food insecurity outcomes among refugee populations, who are highly dependent on food assistance.

### Madagascar

The peak estimates of 2021 and 2022 are comparable. The two IPC analyses covered similar areas – despite two additional districts covered in April 2022, i.e. Mananjary and Nosy-Varika, compared to November 2021 – and have similar percentage in total population coverage (16 and 18 percent, respectively). However, the country population data used by the IPC analysis increased from 27.9 million in November 2021 to 29 million in April 2022 – including for the December 2022–March 2023 projection.

### Malawi

The peak estimates of 2021 and 2022 are comparable (covering similar areas and having less than 10 percentage point difference in total population coverage). However, the country population data used by the IPC analysis decreased from 19.7 million in December 2020 to 19.3 million in November 2021, and the population analysed increased by more than one million people in absolute terms – from 17.7 million to 19.3 million.

### Mozambique

The 2021 and 2022 peak estimates are not comparable. The coverage of the 2022 peak estimate differs from that of 2021, as it relies on the December 2021 IPC analysis while the 2021 peak relies on the January 2021 analysis. The January 2021 analysis covered 33 areas (21 rural and 12 urban areas (including Maputo city)) across 11 provinces, accounting for 60 percent of the total country population, or 18.1 million people. The December 2021 analysis covered 64 districts, of which 10 were provincial capital cities, four were urban districts of Maputo, and 50 were rural districts, comprising 47 percent of the total country population, or 14.5 million people.

## Comparability issues of acute food insecurity estimates in major food crises, 2020–2022 *continued*

### Sudan

The peak estimates of 2021 and 2022 are comparable (covering similar areas and having the same percentage in total population coverage – i.e. 100 percent). However, the country population data used by the IPC analysis increased from 46.8 million in March 2021 to 47.9 million in May 2022.

### Ukraine

The 2021 and 2022 peak estimates are not comparable. While the 2021 peak estimates covered only the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as well as IDP population through the Food Security Cluster estimates using CARI methodology (population coverage reached 15 percent of the total country population, or 6.2 million people), the 2022 peak estimates was provided by FEWS NET's IPC-compatible analysis and covered the entire country inhabited by 43.8 million people.

### Yemen

The peak estimates of 2021 and 2022 are comparable (covering similar areas and having the same percentage in total population coverage – i.e. 100 percent). However, the country population data used by the IPC analysis increased from 30.0 million in December 2020 to 31.9 million in March 2022.

### Zambia

The 2021 and 2022 peak estimates are not comparable. While the 2021 peak estimate (based on the February 2021 IPC analysis) covered 64 rural districts and 38 percent of the population, the 2022 peak estimates – based on the IPC projection made in June 2021 – covered 61 rural districts and 66 percent of the country population.

### Zimbabwe

The 2021 and 2022 peak estimates are not comparable. While the 2021 peak estimates covered only the rural population through IPC (population coverage reached 66 percent of the total country population, or 9.7 million people), the 2022 peak estimates was provided by FEWS NET's IPC-compatible analysis and covered the entire country inhabited by an estimated 15.6 million people.

## Acute food insecurity in the GRFC, data sources and methods

### Acute food insecurity peak estimates

The peak estimate is based on the highest number of acutely food-insecure people in the year in question. It does not reflect the latest analysis available but purely the observed peak.<sup>1</sup>

Estimates derived from non-IPC/CH sources which are not accepted as fully compatible with IPC/CH phases by the TWG are recorded as insufficient data in the GRFC.

IPC/CH projections are estimated by outlining the main assumptions driving the evolution of food security in the projected period. The focus is on the ‘most likely scenario’ which helps to devise the potential changes on population distribution across IPC/CH phases. Also, IPC projections take into account the potential effects of already funded or likely to be funded and delivered humanitarian assistance in the area of analysis. CH projections forecast the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above in a scenario in which no food assistance is provided.

FEWS NET food assistance outlook briefs provide information on the projected severity and magnitude of acute food insecurity (using ranges) and indicate each country’s food-insecure population in need of urgent humanitarian food assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above). FEWS NET projections are based on a scenario development approach where a set of assumptions regarding the evolution of food security drivers and their impacts on food security outcomes in the absence of humanitarian food assistance.

### Data sources for the 2021 peak estimates and available 2022 peak estimates

	Number of countries in 2021	Number of countries in 2022
IPC	26	24
CH	15	15
FEWS NET	2	4
WFP CARI	3	2
HNO	3	1
OTHER (JRP, VASyR, SEFSec)	3	

While Cabo Verde was a data gap in 2021, acute food insecurity estimates for the country became available in 2022.

Forecast sections aim to identify the expected peak of AFI in the currently ongoing year (2022), notably through IPC/CH and IPC-compatible projections indicating the expected peak magnitude of population facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in food crisis countries.

<sup>1</sup> AFI estimates are rounded in this document.

## Notes on disclaimers for 2021 and 2022

### Afghanistan

FEWS NET’s analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in **2022** and the magnitude of acute food insecurity is lower than the IPC Technical Working Group analysis. FEWS NET and the IPC TWG took into account different considerations of the food security and nutrition outcome indicator data, local livelihoods and key sources of food and income and the role of significant humanitarian assistance. Likewise, differences in levels of information available between the two analyses likely contributed to differences in analysis findings.

### Central African Republic

FEWS NET’s analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in 2021 and 2022 and the magnitude of acute food insecurity is lower than in the IPC Technical Working Group analysis. FEWS NET and the IPC TWG took into account different considerations of food security and nutrition outcome indicator data, as well as different considerations of seasonality and access to key sources of food and income, including wild foods and other non-farm activities. This resulted in a lower estimate of the total number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) as well as lower IPC area classifications in FEWS NET’s analysis.

### Democratic Republic of the Congo

FEWS NET’s analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance and the severity of IPC area classifications in 2021 and 2022 is lower than in the IPC TWG analysis. FEWS NET’s analysis covers mostly eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, whereas the IPC Technical Working Group covers most of the country, which accounts for some differences. When comparing similar areas, FEWS NET’s estimates remain lower due in part to differences in contextualizing evidence and outcome indicators, including those related to livelihood change.

## Notes on disclaimers for 2021 and 2022 *continued*

### Ethiopia

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance is lower than the IPC Technical Working Group's estimate for **2021** and HRP's estimate for **2022**. FEWS NET and the IPC Technical Working Group took into account different considerations of food security outcomes indicators, particularly those related to livelihood coping, in the context of local livelihoods patterns and corroborating information. However, in conflict-affected parts of northern Ethiopia, FEWS NET's analysis of contributing factors and likely impacts on food consumption and nutrition suggest more severe acute food insecurity than assessed by the IPC TWG.

### Guatemala

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in Guatemala is lower than the IPC Technical Working Group's estimate for **2022**. FEWS NET and the IPC Technical Working Group took into account different interpretations of key food security indicators, including those related to livelihood coping and those used for both rural and urban populations.

### Haiti

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in 2021 and 2022 is lower than the IPC Technical Working Group estimate. FEWS NET and the IPC Technical Working Group took into account different considerations of food security outcome indicator data following its convergence of evidence among the various indicators, as well as with existing nutrition data. This resulted in a lower estimate of the total number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) as well as lower IPC area classifications in FEWS NET's analysis.

### Niger

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in 2022 is lower than in the Cadre Harmonisé analysis. FEWS NET and the CH's assessment of likely food security outcomes are based on different considerations of how contributing factors and key food security indicators collected in previous analytical periods are likely to apply in 2022 and between rural and urban areas. In addition, the two analyses took into account different considerations of the role of key sources of food and income as a contribution to households meeting their minimum food needs.

### Nigeria

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence led to overall lower numbers of populations in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse than estimated in the Cadre Harmonisé analysis. FEWS NET also analyzed food security in several areas of northeastern Nigeria either not covered by CH analysis or that the CH analyzed as part of larger areas. Among these areas, FEWS NET assessed that several were likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), resulting in differences between FEWS NET and the CH TWG's maps in 2021. Different area-level units of analysis also led FEWS NET and the CH, in part, to differ in their use of food security outcome indicator and livelihood information in their approaches to estimating the size of the acutely food-insecure population.

### Sudan

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in 2021 and 2022 is lower than the IPC Technical Working Group estimate. Among the technical issues most difficult to resolve in 2021 were those surrounding the impacts of COVID-19 restrictions on local livelihoods, while analysis of populations who face chronically poor food consumption and limited livelihoods options, and different considerations of key food security indicators and likely impacts of humanitarian food assistance, likewise contribute to differences.

### Yemen

FEWS NET's analysis of available evidence suggests the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity in 2021 and 2022 is lower than in the IPC analysis. FEWS NET and the IPC Technical Working Group took into account different considerations of food security outcome indicator information, while the analyses also reflect different levels of humanitarian food assistance. FEWS NET and the IPC TWG's 2021 analyses were also conducted at different times, which contributed, in part, to different considerations of the likelihood and expected levels of assistance provision.

### Zimbabwe

FEWS NET's analysis of the available evidence suggests the population requiring humanitarian food assistance in **2021** is higher than the ZimVAC's IPC estimate. FEWS NET's analysis covers both rural and urban populations, while the ZimVAC's analysis only covers rural populations. At the same time, FEWS NET's analysis suggests the area-level severity of acute food insecurity is lower than in the ZimVAC analysis, largely due to different considerations of food security and nutrition outcome indicator data.

## IPC acute malnutrition reference table

Phase name and description	Phase 1 Acceptable	Phase 2 Alert	Phase 3 Serious	Phase 4 Critical	Phase 5 Extremely Critical
	Less than 5% of children are acutely malnourished.	5-9.9% of children are acutely malnourished.	10-14.9% of children are acutely malnourished.	15-29.9% of children are acutely malnourished. The mortality and morbidity levels are elevated or increasing. Individual food consumption is likely to be compromised.	30% or more children are acutely malnourished. Widespread morbidity and/or very large individual food consumption gaps are likely evident.
	The situation is progressively deteriorating, with increasing levels of acute malnutrition. Morbidity levels and/or individual food consumption gaps are likely to increase with increasing levels of acute malnutrition.				
Priority response objective to decrease acute malnutrition and to prevent related mortality. <sup>2</sup>	Maintain the low prevalence of acute malnutrition.	Strengthen existing response capacity and resilience. Address contributing factors to acute malnutrition. Monitor conditions and plan response as required.	<b>Urgently reduce acute malnutrition levels through</b> →		
			Scaling up of treatment and prevention of affected populations.	Significant scale-up and intensification of treatment and protection activities to reach additional population affected.	Addressing widespread acute malnutrition and disease epidemics by all means.
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on weight for height Z-score (WHZ)	<5%	5.0 to 9.9%	10.0 to 14.9%	15.0 to 29.9%	≥30%
Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) based on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)	<5%				
	5-9.9%				
	10-14.9%				
	≥15%				
*GAM based on MUAC must only be used in the absence of GAM based on WHZ; the final IPC Acute Malnutrition phase with GAM based on MUAC should be supported by an analysis of the relationship between WHZ and MUAC in the area of analysis and also by using convergence of evidence with contributing factors. In exceptional conditions where GAM based on MUAC is significantly higher than GAM based on WHZ (i.e. two or more phases), both GAM based on WHZ, and GAM based on MUAC should be considered, and the final phase should be determined with convergence of evidence.					

The IPC Acute Malnutrition Scale classifies the severity of acute malnutrition in the population of reference. The IPC analysis process reviews all contributing factors affecting acute malnutrition in the area of analysis, such as dietary intake, disease, feeding and care practices, health and WASH environment and contextual information such as access to services and mortality are all included in the analysis.



## Nutrition and health, data sources and key indicators

### Wasting

Moderate wasting using the weight for height indicator is identified by weight for height z scores (WHZ) between -2 and -3 of the reference population, and severe wasting by WHZ below -3. Wasting reflects both moderate and severe wasting in a population. Wasting can also be defined by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements  $\leq 12.5$  cm, with severe wasting defined with a measurement of  $\leq 11.5$  cm.

#### Severity index for prevalence of wasting in children aged 6–59 months

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 2.5%	Very low
2.5–< 5%	Low
5–< 10%	Medium
10–< 15%	High
$\geq 15\%$	Very high

Source: De Onis et al. Public Health Nutrition, 2018. Available at: <https://www.who.int/nutrition/team/prevalence-thresholds-wasting-overweight-stunting-children-paper.pdf>

### Stunting

Stunted children under 5 years old are identified by a height for age z score (HAZ) below -2 of the reference population. Severe stunting is defined as HAZ below -3.

#### Severity index for prevalence of stunting in children aged 6–59 months

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 2.5%	Very low
2.5–10%	Low
10–< 20%	Medium
20–<30%	High
$\geq 30\%$	Very high

Source: De Onis et al. Public Health Nutrition, 2018. Available at: <https://www.who.int/nutrition/team/prevalence-thresholds-wasting-overweight-stunting-children-paper.pdf>

## Limitations and data challenges, 2022

### The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect and save lives and livelihoods

This is because some households may only be classified in IPC/CH Phase 1 or 2 because they receive assistance, and are in fact in need of continued action. In many countries, the number in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) refers to populations in need of action further to that already taken.

### Absence of estimates for populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) due to the use of non-IPC/CH data sources for 7 countries

Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan (Syrian refugees), Lebanon (Syrian refugees), Libya, Nicaragua, Uganda, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.

### Lack of/low data availability for refugee food security

Refugee food security is measured in various ways across refugee populations and data are not systematically collected, disaggregated, consolidated or shared.

WFP CARI assessments are available for Syrian refugees in Jordan but are not accepted as equivalent to IPC/CH phases by the GRFC 2022 technical working group.



# BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

## Chapter 1

## Spotlight on global and domestic food prices

- AMIS.** 2022. *Market Monitor*. July 2022. [http://www.amis-outlook.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/amis/docs/Market\\_monitor/AMIS\\_Market\\_Monitor\\_current.pdf](http://www.amis-outlook.org/fileadmin/user_upload/amis/docs/Market_monitor/AMIS_Market_Monitor_current.pdf)
- FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO.** 2022. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639en>
- FAO.** 2022. *FAO Food Price Index* [online]. [Cited 04 September 2022] <https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/>
- FAO.** 2022. *The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine*. June 2022 <https://www.fao.org/3/cb9013en/cb9013en.pdf>
- IFPRI.** 2022. *Ukraine Crisis Monitoring: Analysis of Food Crisis Risks and Policy Responsiveness* [online]. [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://www.foodsecurityportal.org/node/1946>
- IFPRI.** 2022. *The Russia-Ukraine grain agreement: What is at stake?* July 27, 2022. <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-grain-agreement-what-stake>
- IFPRI.** 2022. *Food and Fertilizer Export Restrictions Tracker* [online]. [Cited 23 August 2022] <https://www.foodsecurityportal.org/tools/COVID-19-food-trade-policy-tracker>
- IFPRI.** 2022. *Excessive Food Price Variability Early Warning System* [online]. [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://www.foodsecurityportal.org/tools/excessive-food-price-variability-early-warning-system>
- ODI.** 2022. *The far-reaching economic effects of the Russian war in Ukraine – new analysis ranks the most economically vulnerable countries* [online]. [Cited 23 August 2022] <https://odi.org/en/press/the-far-reaching-economic-effects-of-the-russian-war-in-ukraine-new-analysis-ranks-the-most-economically-vulnerable-countries/>
- ODI.** 2022. *Economic vulnerability to the Russia-Ukraine War: which low- and middle-income countries are most vulnerable?* April 2022. <https://odi.org/en/publications/economic-vulnerability-to-the-russiaukraine-war-which-low-and-middle-income-countries-are-most-vulnerable/>
- UN.** 2022. *Global impact of the war in Ukraine: Billions of people face the greatest cost-of-living crisis in a generation* [online]. [Cited 23 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-impact-war-ukraine-billions-people-face-greatest-cost-living-crisis-generation>
- WFP.** 2022. *War in Ukraine drives global food crisis*. June 2022. <https://www.wfp.org/publications/war-ukraine-drives-global-food-crisis>
- WFP.** 2022. *Implications of the Conflict in Ukraine on Food Access and Availability in the East Africa Region*. June 2022 <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140223/download/>
- WFP.** 2022. *Currencies changes and hotspots*. [online]. [Cited 23 August 2022] <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/version2/reports/global-coverage-currencies-jan-2022>

- WFP.** 2022. *Economic Explorer*. [online]. [Cited 23 August 2022] [https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic\\_explorer/macro-economics/inflation](https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation)
- World Bank.** 2022. *For poor countries already facing debt distress, a food crisis looms*. July 2022. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/poor-countries-already-facing-debt-distress-food-crisis-looms>
- World Bank.** 2022. *Food Security Update*. 15 August 2022. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-update>
- World Bank.** *Food security update*. July 2022 <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/4cda3ceaa5a01b7590e7105fd5e6ca4f-0320012022/original/Food-Security-update-LXVI-July-15-2022.pdf>

## Spotlight on drought in the Horn of Africa

- EU Science Hub.** 2022. *Unprecedented drought brings threat of starvation to millions in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia*. June 2022 [https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news/unprecedented-drought-brings-threat-starvation-millions-ethiopia-kenya-and-somalia-2022-06-09\\_en](https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news/unprecedented-drought-brings-threat-starvation-millions-ethiopia-kenya-and-somalia-2022-06-09_en)
- FAO.** 2022. *Somalia drought update – issued 12 August 2022* <http://www.faoswalim.org/content/somalia-drought-update-%E2%80%93-issued-12-august-2022>
- FAO.** 2022. *Revised rapid response and mitigation plan to avert a humanitarian catastrophe January–December 2022*. July 2022. <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0638en/>
- FAO.** 2022. *Somalia Drought Update 12 August 2022*. <http://www.faoswalim.org/content/somalia-drought-update-%E2%80%93-issued-12-august-2022>
- FSNWG.** 2022. *Drought Special Report July 2022*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/fsnwg-drought-special-report-july-2022>
- IOM, OCHA & UNHCR.** 2022. *Drought Displacement Monitoring Dashboard June 2022*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/drought-displacement-monitoring-dashboard-june-2022>
- IPC.** 2022. *Somalia acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition report, June 2022* [online]. [Cited 22 August 2022] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155662/?iso3=SOM>
- IPC.** 2022. *Somalia faces increased Risk of Famine as acute food insecurity, malnutrition, and mortality worsen*. June 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155662/?iso3=SOM>
- NDMA.** 2022. *National Drought Early Warning Bulletin, June 2022*. <https://www.ndma.go.ke/index.php/resource-center/national-droughtbulletin/send/39-drought-updates/6517-national-monthly-drought-updates-june-2022>
- OCHA.** 2022. *Horn of Africa Drought: Regional Humanitarian Overview & Call To Action*. July 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/horn-africa-drought-regional-humanitarian-overview-call-action-published-4-july-2022>
- UNHCR & NRC.** 2022. *One million people displaced by drought in Somalia, August 2022*. <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2022/8/62f4c3894/million-people-displaced-drought-somalia.html>
- UNICEF.** 2022. *Children suffering dire drought across parts of Africa are 'one disease away from catastrophe' – warns UNICEF*. August 2022. <https://www.unicef.org/turkiye/en/press-releases/children-suffering-dire-drought-across-parts-africa-are-one-disease-away-catastrophe>

- UNICEF.** 2022. *Horn of Africa drought crisis: climate change is here now*. July 2022. [https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/10491/file/UNICEF-Regional-CTA-HoA-Drought-July-2022\(1\).pdf](https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/10491/file/UNICEF-Regional-CTA-HoA-Drought-July-2022(1).pdf)
- WFP.** 2022. *Status of Drought and Outlook for the Second Half of 2022 Across Eastern Horn of Africa*. July 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/status-drought-and-outlook-second-half-2022-across-eastern-horn-africa-2020-2022-period-6th-july-2022>
- WFP.** 2022. *Regional Drought Response Plan for the Horn of Africa May–December 2022*. July 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/regional-drought-response-plan-horn-africa-may-december-2022>
- WHO.** 2022. *Disease Outbreak News*. April 2022. <https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON371>

## Chapter 2

## Central and Southern Africa

- FAO.** 2022. *Crop Prospects and Food Situation*. July 2022. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc0868en/cc0868en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** *Zimbabwe key message update*. July 2022. <https://fews.net/southern-africa/zimbabwe/key-message-update/july-2022>
- FEWS NET.** *Malawi key message update*. July 2022. <https://fews.net/southern-africa/malawi/key-message-update/july-2022>
- FEWS NET.** *Southern Africa key message update June 2022*. <https://fews.net/southern-africa/key-message-update/june-2022>
- IOM.** 2022. *Displacement Tracking Matrix Mozambique*. [online] [Cited 08 August 2022] <https://dtm.iom.int/mozambique>
- IPC.** 2022. *Malawi: Acute Food Insecurity June–September 2022 and Projection for October 2022–March 2023*. August 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155839/?iso3=MWI>
- IPC.** 2022. *Central African Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update April–August 2022*. April 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155567/?iso3=CAF>
- IPC.** 2021. *Democratic Republic of Congo Acute Food insecurity Snapshot*. November 2021. [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_DRC\\_FoodSecurity\\_Nutrition\\_2021Sept2022Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_FoodSecurity_Nutrition_2021Sept2022Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)
- IPC.** 2021. *Angola: Acute Food Insecurity Situation and Acute Malnutrition Situation April 2021–March 2022*. September 2021. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1155118/>
- IPC.** 2021. *Eswatini: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update December 2021–March 2022*. January 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155401/?iso3=SWZ>
- IPC.** 2021. *Lesotho: Acute Food Insecurity Situation November–December 2021 and Projection for January–March 2022*. January 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155404/?iso3=LSO>
- IPC.** 2022. *Madagascar: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for April–August 2022 and Projections for September–November 2022 and December–March*

2023. May 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fr/c/1155618/?iso3=MDG>

**IPC.** 2021. *Malawi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation November–December 2021 and January–March 2022.* December 2021. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155382/?iso3=MWI>

**IPC.** 2021. *Mozambique: Acute Food Insecurity Situation November 2021–March 2022 and Projection for April–September 2022.* December 2021. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155342/?iso3=MOZ>

**IPC.** 2021. *Zambia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation: July–September 2021 and Projection for October 2021–March 2022.* August 2021. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155081/?iso3=ZMB>

### East Africa

**FEWS NET.** 2022. *Unprecedented drought brings threat of starvation to millions in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.* June 2022. <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/Joint%20Statement%20Horn%20of%20Africa%209%20June%202022.pdf>

**IPC.** 2022. *Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April–May 2022 and Projection for June–September 2022.* June 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155656/?iso3=BDI>

**IPC.** 2022. *Djibouti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March–June 2022 and Projection for July–December 2022.* May 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155581/>

**IPC.** 2022. *Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation May 2022 and Projection June–September 2022.* June 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155662/?iso3=SOM>

**IPC.** 2022. *Somalia: IPC Risk of Famine Snapshot May–September 2022.* June 2022. [https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Somalia\\_AFI\\_AMN\\_Snapshot%20Update%20RoF\\_May%202022%20Final.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Somalia_AFI_AMN_Snapshot%20Update%20RoF_May%202022%20Final.pdf)

**IPC.** 2022. *Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update March–June 2022.* June 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/fi/c/1155687/?iso3=KEN>

**IPC.** 2022. *South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Situation for February–March 2022 and Projections for April–July 2022.* April 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155527/>

**IPC.** 2022. *Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April–May 2022 and Projections for June–September 2022 and October 2022–February 2023.* June 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155716/>

**OCHA.** 2022. *Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Plan.* July 2022. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ethiopia/document/ethiopia-humanitarian-response-plan-jul-2022-en>

**WFP.** 2022. *Regional Drought Response Plan for the Horn of Africa May–December 2022.* July 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/regional-drought-response-plan-horn-of-africa-may-december-2022>

**WFP.** 2022. *Regional Food Security and Nutrition Update Eastern Africa Region.* August 2022. <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000141659/>

download/

### West Africa

**FAO.** 2022. *Crop prospects and food situation Quarterly global report.* July 2022. <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0868en>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2022. *West Africa – Sahel Food insecurity at unprecedented levels in most coastal and Sahelian countries.* May 2022. <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0114en>

**RPCA.** 2022. *Food and nutrition crisis 2022.* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://www.food-security.net/en/topic/crise-alimentaire-et-nutritionnelle-2022/>

**RPCA.** 2022. *Impact of the high cost of living and the Russia-Ukraine Crisis on food and nutritional Security in the Sahel and West Africa.* July 2022. [https://www.food-security.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/note-aux-decideurs\\_SAN\\_criseUR\\_N1\\_eng.pdf](https://www.food-security.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/note-aux-decideurs_SAN_criseUR_N1_eng.pdf)

### Eurasia

**ACAPS.** 2022. *Humanitarian Access Overview (July 2022).* Geneva. [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps\\_humanitarian\\_access\\_overview\\_july\\_2022\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf)

**FAO.** 2022. *The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the War in Ukraine (10 June 2022 Update).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://www.fao.org/3/cb9013en/cb9013en.pdf>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2022. *GIEWS Country Brief on Bangladesh (24 June 2022 Update).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=BGD>

**FEWS NET.** 2022. *Afghanistan Key Message Update (July 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://fews.net/central-asia/afghanistan>

**FEWS NET.** 2022. *Ukraine Targeted Analysis (April 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/targeted-analysis/april-2022>

**FEWS NET.** 2022. *Yemen Key Message Update (July 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://fews.net/east-africa/yemen>

**GEOGLAM.** 2022. *Crop Monitor for Early Warning (August 4, 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://cropmonitor.org/index.php/cmreports/earlywarning-report/>

**IMF.** 2022. *IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Combined Seventh and Eight Reviews for Pakistan's Extended Fund Facility (July 13, 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/07/13/pr22255-pakistan-staff-level-agreement-on-7th-and-8th-eff-review>

**IPC.** 2022. *Yemen: Acute Malnutrition Situation January–May 2022 and Projection for June–December 2022 (March 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155480/?iso3=YEM>

**IPC.** 2021. *Pakistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October 2021–March/April 2022 and Projection for April/May–June 2022.* October 2021 <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155374/>

**Mamun, A., Glauber, J. & Laborde, D.** 2022. *IFPRI Blog. In: How the war in Ukraine threatens Bangladesh's food security.* <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/how-war-ukraine-threatens-bangladeshs-food-security>

**OCHA.** 2022. *Afghanistan Emergency Earthquake Response Plan (July–September 2022)* | ReliefWeb. [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-emergency-earthquake-response-plan-july-september-2022-summary-emergency-needs-people-reached-and-funding-requirements-11-august-2022>

**OCHA.** 2022. *Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022 (March 2022)* | ReliefWeb. [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-humanitarian-needs-overview-2022-march-2022>

**OCHA.** 2022. *Yemen: Situation Update – Humanitarian Impact of Flooding (July 27, 2022)* | ReliefWeb. [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-situation-update-humanitarian-impact-flooding-27-july-2022-enar>

**WFP.** 2022. *Pakistan Country Brief (June 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000141399/download/>

**WFP and FAO.** 2022. *Hunger Hotspots. FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity (June to September 2022 Outlook).* Rome. [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] [https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000139904/download/?\\_ga=2.266193423.1826635275.1660582062-1472527584.1659628295](https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000139904/download/?_ga=2.266193423.1826635275.1660582062-1472527584.1659628295)

**WoS FSS.** 2022. *Repercussions of Ukraine crisis on food security in Syria (Sitrep 2 – July 2022)* | Food Security Cluster. [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://fscluster.org/syria/document/fss-sitrep2-repercussions-ukraine-crisis>

### Latin America and the Caribbean

**ECLAC.** 2022. *The sociodemographic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/CRPD.4/3).* Santiago. [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] [https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47923/S2200158\\_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47923/S2200158_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

**FAO.** 2022. *Net Food Importing Developing Countries Dashboard.* [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] [https://data.apps.fao.org/catalog/dataset/special-country-groups/resource/56ac7f70-6286-426d-8579-555390927bc3?inner\\_span=True](https://data.apps.fao.org/catalog/dataset/special-country-groups/resource/56ac7f70-6286-426d-8579-555390927bc3?inner_span=True)

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2022. *Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Bulletin (12 July 2022).* [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] <https://www.fao.org/3/cc0908en/cc0908en.pdf>

**FAO-GIEWS.** 2022. *GIEWS Country Brief on Haiti (12 August 2022 Update).* [online] [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=HTI>

**FEWS NET.** 2022. *Central America and the Caribbean Food Security Outlook (July 2022).* [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] <https://fews.net/central-america-and-caribbean/food-security-outlook/july-2022>

**FEWS NET.** 2022. *Central America and the Caribbean Seasonal Monitor (July 2022).* [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] <https://fews.net/central-america-and-caribbean/seasonal-monitor/july-2022>

**GEOGLAM.** 2022. *Crop Monitor for Early Warning (August 4, 2022).* [online] [Cited 11 August 2022] <https://cropmonitor.org/index.php/cmreports/earlywarning-report/>

- IDB.** 2022. *From Recovery to Renaissance: Turning crisis into opportunity.* [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] <https://flagships.iadb.org/en/MacroReport2022/From-Recovery-to-Renaissance-Turning-Crisis-into-Opportunity>
- IMF DataMapper.** April 2022. *Haiti Country Data.* [online] [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/HT#countrydata>
- IPC.** 2022. *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update March–June 2022.* March 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155488/?iso3=HTI>
- IPC.** 2022. *Guatemala Acute Food Insecurity Situation March to May 2022 and Projections for June–September 2022 and October 2022–February 2023.* June 2022 <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155665/>
- Laborde, D.** 2022. *IFPRI In: Fertilizer Dashboard.* [https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/laborde6680/viz/Fertilizer\\_Dashboard/FertilizerDashboard](https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/laborde6680/viz/Fertilizer_Dashboard/FertilizerDashboard)
- OCHA.** 2022. *Haiti: Impact of the deteriorating security situation on humanitarian access (July 8, 2022).* | *ReliefWeb.* [online] [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-impact-deteriorating-security-situation-humanitarian-access-background-note-8-july-2022>
- OCHA.** 2022. *Haiti: Violence in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (May 26, 2022).* | *ReliefWeb.* [online] [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-violence-port-au-prince-metropolitan-area-situation-report-3-26-may-2022>
- UNCT Haiti.** 2022. *UN humanitarian agencies deliver relief aid directly to people affected by violence in Cité Soleil.* | *ReliefWeb.* [online] [Cited 20 August 2022] <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/un-humanitarian-agencies-deliver-relief-aid-directly-people-affected-violence-cite-soleil>
- WFP.** 2022. *Multiple crises and surging gang violence set to worsen hunger in Haiti (July 12, 2022).* [online] [Cited 10 August 2022] <https://www.wfp.org/news/multiple-crises-and-surgings-gang-violence-set-worsen-hunger-haiti>

### Technical notes

- WFP GORP.** 2022. *Global Food Crisis 2022* [online]. [Cited JU 2022]. <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140306/download/?ga=2.164215548.299764989.1662200489-204888971.1656068046>



Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP in 2016, the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors committed to addressing the root causes of food crises and finding lasting solutions to them, through shared analysis and knowledge, strengthened coordination in evidence-based responses and collective efforts across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.

 [www.fightfoodcrises.net](http://www.fightfoodcrises.net)  [@fightfoodcrises](https://twitter.com/fightfoodcrises)



Founded by FAO, IFPRI and WFP, the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) facilitates the exchange of technical expertise, knowledge and best practice among food security and nutrition practitioners. Its purpose is to promote timely, independent and consensus-based information about food crises, while also highlighting and addressing critical data gaps. As a key partner of the GNAFC, FSIN coordinates the publication of the *Global Report on Food Crises*.

 [www.fsinplatform.org](http://www.fsinplatform.org)  [@FSIN\\_News](https://twitter.com/FSIN_News)